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ARTICLES
IS  THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  CONSTITUTIONAL?
AN ORIGINALIST  ARGUMENT  FOR
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Christine Kexel Chabot*
Originalists have written off the Federal Reserve’s independent monetary policy decisions as
an unconstitutional novelty.  This Article demonstrates that the independent structure of the
Federal Reserve dates back to a Founding-era agency known as the Sinking Fund Commission.
Like the Federal Reserve, the Commission conducted open market purchases of U.S. securities
with substantial independence from the President.  The Commission’s independent structure was
proposed by Alexander Hamilton, passed by the First Congress, and signed into law by President
George Washington.  Their decisions to create an independent Commission with multiple mem-
bers to check the President and one another—and to include the Vice President and Chief Justice
as Commissioners who could not be replaced or removed by the President—belie the notion that
such independence violated the newly minted Constitution.  The Sinking Fund Commission
establishes that the Federal Reserve’s independent structure has an impeccable originalist prove-
nance and does not violate the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump has been greatly vexed by his inability to control the
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decisions.1  This should come as no sur-
prise, as the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee has more
power over the national economy (and perhaps over the upcoming presiden-
tial election) than any other agency.  The President might ask the Supreme
Court for help, and his request would find support in originalist arguments
that the Committee’s independence unconstitutionally restricts the Presi-
dent’s executive power2 and circumvents the Appointments Clause.3  Accord-
1 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 18, 2019, 2:25 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1174388901806362624 (“Jay Powell and
the Federal Reserve Fail Again.  No ‘guts,’ no sense, no vision!”).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  Ever since Peter Strauss launched the modern
academic debate about independent agencies, Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Gov-
ernment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583 (1984),
numerous scholars have challenged the independence of the Federal Reserve as inconsis-
tent with Article II. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
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ing to leading originalists, independent agencies, such as the Open Market
Committee, have relatively recent pedigrees that cannot possibly be “ascer-
tain[ed by] the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution” or supported by
“sources such as James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamil-
ton.”4  The Federal Reserve’s critics contend that the original meaning of
Article II precludes an independent structure and requires the President to
“determine the policies” pursued by the Federal Reserve.5
This Article demonstrates that Alexander Hamilton, the First Congress,
and President George Washington did not share these assumptions about the
unconstitutionality of independent agencies.  Alexander Hamilton himself
proposed an obscure independent agency, known as the Sinking Fund Com-
mission, which conducted the same open market purchases of U.S. securities
as today’s Open Market Committee.  The Commission’s independent struc-
ture was also passed by the First Congress and signed into law by President
Washington.6  In its “Act Making Provision for the Reduction of the Public
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 6 (2008); see also PETER
CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 107 (2016) (“[A]s
presently designed, the Reserve Banks are almost certainly unconstitutional.”); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 43, 96–97 (noting that the Federal
Reserve is an “institution created without regard to the basic principle of separation of
powers upon which our government was founded”).
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Originalists have asserted broader Appointments
Clause requirements in apparent conflict with Reserve Bank presidents’ role on the Com-
mittee. See Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 73, 77–78 (2009) (noting that officials might count as “principal officers
because of the nature and scope of their authority”); Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers
of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 450, 462 (2018) (noting that Article II’s original
appointments requirements extended beyond persons who exercised significant authority
of the United States and had power to bind third parties); see also CONTI-BROWN, supra note
2, at 113 (arguing that regional bank presidents violate Article II’s requirements for
appointments of principal officers).
4 Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Depravity of the 1930s and the Modern Adminis-
trative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 821, 823 (2018).
5 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 6.
6 Existing surveys provide limited and divergent analyses of the Sinking Fund Com-
mission. Compare Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Founda-
tions, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1291 (2006) (noting Commissioners’ general
independence from executive appointments and removal), and JERRY L. MASHAW, CREAT-
ING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 43–44 (2012), with CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 53 (explaining
that the Commission still included a majority of “executive branch members” who “were
obviously removable at will”), SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGIN-
NING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 280 (2015) (noting that Congress
“expressly authorized the president to approve the commissioners’ decisions” to purchase
debt in the form of U.S. securities, although removal provisions for the Chief Justice were
“less clear”), Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Double Duty Across the Magisterial Branches, 44 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 26, 33 (2019) (noting that the Commission “assigned executive duties to
federal judges”), Aditya Bamzai, Tenure of Office and the Treasury: The Constitution and Control
over National Financial Policy, 1787 to 1867, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1299, 1339 (2019) (argu-
ing that both approbation and removal at will ensured presidential control of the Sinking
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Debt,” Congress authorized open market purchases of debt, in the form of
U.S. securities, “under the direction of the President of the Senate, the Chief
Justice, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney
General.”7  This statute thereby established an independent structure in
which Founders who occupied key principal offices became ex officio mem-
bers of the Sinking Fund Commission: John Adams (President of the Senate/
Vice President), John Jay (Chief Justice), Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of
State), Alexander Hamilton (Secretary of the Treasury), and Edmund Ran-
dolph (Attorney General).
The Sinking Fund Commission carried out open market purchases of
U.S. securities with substantial independence from the President.  President
Washington had no power to initiate open market purchases without
approval of a majority of the Commission, and the Commission’s multimem-
ber structure allowed it to make purchasing decisions independently of a uni-
fied executive policy.  The Commission’s decisions reflected diversity of
opinion and even cabinet members’ public disagreement, as reflected in
Thomas Jefferson’s dissent from purchases urged by Alexander Hamilton.8
Congress also circumvented the President’s appointments power by designat-
ing existing officers as ex officio Commissioners.  In addition, Congress elim-
inated the President’s power to replace or remove Commissioners when it
placed the Chief Justice and Vice President on the Commission.
The Sinking Fund Commission’s independent structure was not merely
enacted into law, but it was proposed by Alexander Hamilton, who was both a
Framer of the Constitution and President Washington’s Secretary of the
Treasury.  The legislation was then passed by the First Congress, with oppor-
tunity for votes and input from many members who “had helped to compose
or to ratify the Constitution itself,”9 and subsequently signed into law by Pres-
ident George Washington.  One would expect all of these actors to have a
clear grasp on the original public meaning of the Constitution,10 as well as a
Fund Commission), and LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY, 1789–1801, at 351 (1948) (briefly noting the Commission’s role in repaying
debt).  Earlier surveys do not discuss the Commission. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994);
Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Adminis-
tration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
7 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 2, 1 Stat. 186.
8 See infra discussion surrounding notes 306–09.
9 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789–1801, at 3–4 (1997) (noting that the First Congress included James Madison, Oliver
Ellsworth, Elbridge Gerry, Rufus King, Robert Morris, and William Paterson).
10 See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1659
(2020) (“[T]he practice of the First Congress is strong evidence of the original meaning of
the Constitution.”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (noting that an act “passed by the first Congress assembled under
the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument”
offers “contemporaneous and weighty evidence” of the Constitution’s “true meaning”
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 127 U.S.
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strong dedication to the structural commitments established therein.11
Their decisions to form an independent Sinking Fund Commission belie the
notion that an independent agency structure violated the newly minted
Constitution.
Although Alexander Hamilton was in general a proponent of a singular
and energetic executive,12 Hamilton’s writings about sinking funds acknowl-
edge the countervailing importance of insulating the Commission’s
purchases from political influence.  By the time Hamilton proposed a sinking
fund in the United States, sinking funds had already had a lengthy track
record in England.  Problems with the misuse of funds in England were well
known and described in widely read treatises such as Adam Smith’s The
Wealth of Nations.13  Hamilton echoed Adam Smith’s concerns when he ques-
tioned whether funds set aside for repayment of debt would tempt political
actors to wrongfully divert funds to more politically expedient uses.14  The
Commission’s independent structure marks a deliberate and important deci-
sion not to entrust a single elected President with absolute control over the
execution of federal laws.  Hamilton proposed that the Commission have
complete authority to authorize open market purchases within the parame-
ters set by Congress.15  While Congress ultimately granted the President
power to approve these purchases, the President still shared approval power
with the Commission.  He had no ability to initiate open market purchases
without approval of a majority of the Commission,16 just as the President
today has no power to lower interest rates unless a majority of the Open
Market Committee agrees to take action to expand the money supply.
The Sinking Fund Commission’s independent structure provides a
direct precedent in support of an independent Federal Open Market Com-
mittee.  In statutes creating both the Sinking Fund Commission and the
Open Market Committee, Congress empowered each agency to initiate open
market purchases of U.S. securities.  In both instances, Congress insulated
open market purchases from presidential control by requiring a multimem-
265, 297 (1888))); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852
(1989) (noting that the “understanding of the First Congress and of the leading partici-
pants in the Constitutional Convention” offers a “contemporaneous understanding of the
President’s removal power”); see also Mascott, supra note 3, at 507–08 (analyzing “how the
First Congress implemented the Constitution” to confirm a broader understanding of “the
original public meaning of ‘officer’”).
11 See Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021,
1028 (2006) (lauding the “earnestness and erudition” of debates over the meaning of the
Constitution in the First Congress).
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“Decision, activity, . . . and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one
man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number . . . .”).
13 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
873 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776).
14 See infra discussion surrounding notes 248–53.
15 See infra notes 227–30.
16 See supra note 7.
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ber agency to approve all purchases.17  Just as the President’s current
demands for lower interest rates depend on a majority of the Federal Open
Market Committee to take action to expand the money supply, in 1790 Presi-
dent Washington had no power to initiate open market purchases without
approval of a majority of the Sinking Fund Commission.18  The multimem-
ber structures of the Sinking Fund Commission and of the Open Market
Committee have allowed members of each agency to check the President and
also one another by presenting divergent views and dissenting from disputed
purchases.19
Congress also protected members of the Sinking Fund Commission and
Open Market Committee from removal by the President.20  The Open Mar-
ket Committee’s twelve voting members include seven Federal Reserve Gov-
ernors, who may be removed by the President only “for cause,” and five
Federal Reserve bank presidents, who can be removed by the Governors at
will.21  This arrangement affords the President greater control over Gover-
nors and bank presidents than the President had over some members of the
Sinking Fund Commission.  The President was incapable of removing or
replacing the Sinking Fund Commissioners who already occupied the offices
of the Chief Justice and President of the Senate (or Vice President), and
served as ex officio members of the Commission.22
Further, statutory provisions establishing ex officio Sinking Fund Com-
missioners suggest that presidents of Federal Reserve banks may serve on the
17 Congress insulated the Sinking Fund Commission from political pressure to misap-
propriate funds, and it also insulated the Federal Reserve from political pressure to cut
interest rates. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Inde-
pendence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 613 (2010) (“[T]he Fed would be willing to raise interest
rates to quell inflation over the long run, though politicians might not for fear of the short-
term consequences.”); Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 503, 553 (2000) (“[P]oliticians have a difficult enough time attempting to influ-
ence monetary policy in order to enhance their electoral chances.”); Seila L. LLC v. Con-
sumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2237 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in the
judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Federal Reserve’s
independence stops a President trying to win a second term from manipulating interest
rates.”).
18 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 2, 1 Stat. 186.  The Act provided that the “purchases
to be made of the said debt, shall be made under the direction of the President of the
Senate, the Chief Justice, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Attorney General.”  Id.  These Commissioners, “or any three of whom, with the approba-
tion of the President of the United States, shall cause the said purchases to be made in
such manner, and under such regulations as shall appear to them best calculated to fulfill
the intent of this act.”  Id.
19 See infra notes 306–16.
20 The feature allowing officers to “serve a term of years and be removable only for
cause before his or her term expires” demarcates “an agency as ‘independent.’”  Rachel E.
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
27 (2010); see also Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163, 1168 (2013).
21 See infra notes 43, 54.
22 See supra note 7.
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Open Market Committee without being appointed by the President.23  The
First Congress did not allow the President any discretion in making appoint-
ments to the Commission and specified that certain officers would become
ex officio Commissioners.24  Congress’s decision to make the Secretaries of
State and Treasury and Attorney General ex officio Commissioners may have
been a permissible expansion of duties germane to existing executive
offices.25  But the Chief Justice was a different matter.  The statute placed the
Chief Justice on the Commission automatically, even though his preexisting
appointment was in the judicial branch and involved adjudicatory functions
wholly unrelated to purchase of debt.26  The First Congress failed to provide
any appointments process before placing the Chief Justice in an executive
office.  This suggests that not all members of a multimember agency need to
be appointed as executive officers, at least when they serve alongside princi-
pal officers properly appointed to the executive branch.
This Article proceeds to address the Federal Open Market Committee’s
constitutionality as follows.  In Part I, it describes the independent structure
of the Federal Open Market Committee, and in Part II, the Article outlines
originalist arguments that this independent structure violates Article II of the
U.S. Constitution.  In Part III, the Article describes the independent Sinking
Fund Commission, as it was originally proposed by Secretary of the Treasury,
Alexander Hamilton, enacted by the First Congress and President Washing-
ton, and operated by a five-member Commission comprised of Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, Edmund Randolph, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams.
Part IV concludes that the Sinking Fund Commission provides a direct,
Founding-era precedent in support of the independent structure of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee.  As this Founding-era history demonstrates,
originalists have no ground to reject the Federal Open Market Committee’s
independent structure as an unconstitutional novelty of the twentieth cen-
tury.  Rather, the independence stemming from the Committee’s multimem-
ber structure, protections from removal, and limited appointment
opportunities has an impeccable originalist provenance that dates back to
the Founding of our Republic.
I. THE INDEPENDENT STRUCTURE OF THE OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE
A long-term interest in financial stability has led Congress to shelter the
Open Market Committee from immediate political pressure to heat up the
economy and expand the money supply through open market purchases.27
23 See supra note 7.
24 PRAKASH, supra note 6, at 279 (noting that the sinking fund legislation “directly
vested executive functions upon the office of the chief justice”).
25 See infra note 338.
26 For an explanation of why the dual appointment does not conflict with Article III,
see Prakash, supra note 6, at 26, 33 (noting that the Constitution does not “prevent[ ]
someone from being both a judge and an executive”).
27 See Barkow, supra note 20, at 29 (explaining that political independence is needed,
though, to achieve a “long-term goal of economic growth” because “achieving that goal
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The constraints imposed by the independent central banking functions of
the Open Market Committee have been compared to a passage from
Homer’s Odyssey,28 in which Odysseus had to be lashed to the mast of his ship
in order to resist the immediate temptation of the sirens’ songs.29  Politicians
naturally covet the Committee’s power over the national economy, especially
during an election year, and they often wish “to influence monetary policy in
order to enhance their electoral chances.”30  But Congress gave the Commit-
tee an independent structure and limited the President’s control over the
Committee’s monetary policy decisions.
The Open Market Committee has twelve voting members and is one part
of the Federal Reserve System.  Many aspects of the Federal Reserve System
have not drawn serious constitutional challenges,31 and criticisms have
focused on the hybrid and independent structure of the Open Market Com-
mittee.  The Committee draws seven members from the System’s “central
governing Board,” which is currently known as the Board of Governors, and
five remaining members from presidents who direct “a decentralized operat-
ing structure of 12 Reserve Banks.”32  The Committee’s hybrid structure has
led one member of Congress to describe the Federal Reserve as a “pretty
queer duck” constitutionally speaking.33
The Committee’s decisions to sell or purchase U.S. securities are a “key
tool used . . . in the implementation of monetary policy” and fulfill a dual
mandate to strengthen the national economy by maintaining stable prices
and full employment.34  Congress granted the Committee exclusive and
often requires politically unpopular actions in the short term”); accord Bressman & Thomp-
son, supra note 17, at 613–14; Ramirez, supra note 17, at 553.
28 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 2 (noting metaphor and that Odysseus is typically
“referred to in central banking circles by his Latin name Ulysses”).
29 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 273 (Roger Fagles trans., 1996).
30 Ramirez, supra note 17, at 553.
31 Less controversial functions include traditional regulatory activities of the seven-
member Board of Governors and regional Reserve Banks’ provision of financial services
for banks in their respective Districts. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 10, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
aboutthefed/files/pf_2.pdf (noting the Board’s “responsibility for supervising and regulat-
ing certain financial institutions and activities”); id. at 14 (“[E]ach Reserve Bank acts as a
‘bank for banks.’”).
32 Structure of the Federal Reserve System: About the Federal Reserve System, BD. GOVERNORS
FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-sys-
tem.htm (Mar. 3, 2017).
33 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 106 (quoting Representative Patman); see also id. at
107 (“[A]s presently designed, the Reserve Banks are almost certainly unconstitutional.”).
34 Policy Tools: Open Market Operations, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (Mar. 16, 2020).  The Federal
Reserve’s “approach to the implementation of monetary policy has evolved considerably
since the financial crisis” of 2008, with expansions of “holding[s] of longer-term securities
through open market purchases,” id., as well as additional monetary policy tools including
interest on required reserve balances and excess balances, and overnight reverse repur-
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independent authority to direct and regulate open market operations.35
Although the sales or purchases of U.S. securities could also be conducted by
private actors, when the Committee effectuates monetary policy through
open market purchases, it executes laws empowering the Committee to regu-
late the value of money under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.36
Congress requires the Open Market Committee to ensure that its purchases
are made “with a view to accommodating commerce and business and with
regard to their bearing upon the general credit situation of the country.”37
In addition, Congress has directed the Open Market Committee to “maintain
long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with
the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates.”38
The Banking Act of 1935 established the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee’s current, independent structure.39  In addition to the independence
generally associated with a multimember group,40 all of the Open Market
Committee’s voting members possess substantial independence from the
President in both their appointments and tenure in office.41  The Act pro-
vides that the seven members of the Board of Governors will serve as ex
officio members of the Open Market Committee.  While these Governors are
initially “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate,”42 the Governors’ fourteen-year terms and staggered vacancies
will almost certainly subject a President to some Governors appointed by ear-
lier administrations.  Governors also serve for fourteen-year terms “unless
sooner removed for cause by the President.”43  For-cause protections from
removal allow the Governors to make monetary policy decisions indepen-
dently of the President, and these tenure protections have allowed Jay Powell
to ignore President Trump’s instructions without being fired from his post as
Governor.44
chase agreements. See Policy Tools, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federal
reserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm (Apr. 15, 2020).
35 12 U.S.C. § 263(b) (2018).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
37 12 U.S.C. § 263(c).
38 Id. § 225a.
39 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 30.  The current twelve-member structure is set
forth in 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).
40 Barkow, supra note 20, at 26 (noting that “a multimember design” is a “[t]raditional
[l]odestar[ ] of [i]ndependence”).
41 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).
42 Id. § 241.
43 Id. § 242.  Provisions allowing officers to “serve a term of years and be removable
only for cause before his or her term expires” is the design feature “that is most often used
to demarcate an agency as ‘independent.’”  Barkow, supra note 20, at 27.
44 The President’s power to demote Powell from his position as Chair of the Board of
Governors would not necessarily prevent Powell from serving as Chair of the Open Market
Committee.  The President may designate from among existing Governors a chairman
once every four years, 12 U.S.C. § 242, and the Act’s “for cause” protections may not pre-
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The five remaining members of the Open Market Committee “shall be
presidents or first vice presidents of Federal Reserve banks,”45 and these
bank presidents are accountable to the Governors in both their appointment
to and removal from office.  The Act provides that bank presidents or vice
presidents who serve as “representatives of the Federal Reserve banks” shall
be “elected annually” by boards of directors of the regional Federal Reserve
Banks.46  In practice, this provision has resulted in an annual rotation of rep-
resentatives along geographic lines mandated by statute.47  The President of
the New York Federal Reserve Bank always serves as one representative, and
presidents from distinct geographic clusters of Reserve banks fill the remain-
ing four seats “on a rotating basis.”48  In order to become a Federal Reserve
bank president or vice president who is eligible to serve on the Committee,
one must be “appointed by the Class B and Class C directors of the bank, with
the approval of the Board of Governors.”49  The statute places ultimate responsi-
bility for the selection of these officers in the Board of Governors, who must
approve the directors’ choices of the president and vice president.50
Once appointed, a president has a five-year term and direct control over
“all other executive officers and all employees” of her or his Federal Reserve
bank.51  In turn, the statute subjects each Federal Reserve bank to the “super-
vision and control” of its board of directors.52  The Board of Governors exer-
cises “general supervision”53 over Federal Reserve banks and has direct
power “[t]o suspend or remove any officer or director of any Federal reserve
bank.”54  The Act does not require particular grounds for removal and pro-
vides only that the “cause of such removal . . . be forthwith communicated in
writing by the Board of Governors . . . to the removed officer.”55  This struc-
vent the Board of Governors’ chairman from being demoted to a mere Governor before
the end of the four-year term.  Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1178–79.  The Chair of the
Board of Governors does not necessarily serve as Chair of the Open Market Committee,
however, and the Committee’s Rules of Organization allow the Committee to appoint its
own chair annually and independently of the President. See Federal Open Market Com-
mittee: Rules of Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7948 (Feb. 16, 2005); see also FED. RSRV.
SYS., FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE RULES AND AUTHORIZATIONS 5 (2018), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_RulesAuthPamphlet_201801.pdf.
45 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).
46 Id.
47 FAQs: How Is the Federal Reserve System Structured?, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12593.htm (Aug. 17, 2016).
48 Id.  The Committee’s procedural rules also allow the seven, nonvoting presidents of
other Reserve Banks to attend and participate in meetings.  12 C.F.R. § 272.3(d) (2020).
49 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2018) (emphasis added) (noting that the “first vice president” shall
be appointed “in the same manner and for the same term as the president”).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. § 301.
53 Id. § 248(j).
54 Id. § 248(f).
55 Id.; see also Daniel Hemel, Maybe the Federal Reserve Banks Are Constitutional After All,
YALE J. ON REGUL. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/maybe-the-federal-reserve-
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ture grants Governors ultimate responsibility for placing bank presidents in
office and allows the Governors to remove bank presidents at will.
The bank presidents’ general accountability to the Governors has not
led to Governors’ complete control over bank presidents’ votes on the Open
Market Committee.  As members of the Open Market Committee, the bank
presidents and Governors each cast independent Committee votes, so that
“the Reserve Bank presidents and the governors” may be seen to act as “col-
leagues” and not “hierarchical entities.”56  Reserve Bank presidents some-
times dissent from decisions taken by a majority of the Committee.57  At the
same time, bank presidents remain subject to the Committee’s procedural
rules and are generally intended to provide a minority of votes.58  While
vacancies on the Board of Governors might, on occasion, deny the Governors
a majority of Committee votes,59 these vacancies would not deprive the
Board itself of the quorum it would need to remove a bank representative
who neglected her duties on the Committee.60  The five regional bank presi-
dents also cannot form a quorum of the Committee necessary to transact
business unless two or more Governors are present at a Committee meet-
ing.61  This structure limits bank presidents’ power to authorize sales or
purchases by the Committee without Governors’ participation and approval.
As a whole, the Open Market Committee operates with substantial inde-
pendence from the President.  The Governors enjoy fourteen-year terms and
for-cause protections from removal before the end of these terms.  Federal
Reserve bank presidents who serve on the Open Market Committee are not
banks-are-constitutional-after-all-by-daniel-hemel/. But see CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at
114–15 & n.20 (noting that under 12 U.S.C. § 614, “all three classes” of a Federal Reserve
Bank’s directors would “have to fire the Reserve Bank president, who is removable at the
pleasure of the board”).  Section 614’s provisions allowing directors to “dismiss . . . officers
or employees . . . at pleasure” discuss corporate structure of all organizations approved to
do foreign banking and seem unlikely to qualify more specific provisions awarding the
Governors general supervisory power and ability to fire the Reserve Bank’s officers and
directors.  12 U.S.C. § 614 (2018).
56 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 115.
57 See Daniel L. Thornton & David C. Wheelock, Making Sense of Dissents: A History of
FOMC Dissents, 96 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 213, 213 (2014) (noting that
“[d]issenting votes are not unusual” at Federal Open Market Committee meetings); id. at
216 fig.2 (recording significant numbers of dissents cast by presidents from 1957–2013).
58 Procedural rules provide that the Committee will generally take actions at in-person
meetings, 12 C.F.R. § 272.4(a) (2020), and that the Committee requires a quorum of seven
members in order to “transact[ ] business,” id. § 272.3(c).
59 Presidents have often left extended vacancies on the board, including three
instances in the Obama administration in which Governors were a “four-to-five minority.”
CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 116–17.
60 See Federal Reserve System: Rules of Organization, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,496, 55,496
(Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 265) (“[I]f there are three or fewer Board
members in office, then a quorum consists of all Board members currently in office.”).
61 The Open Market Committee’s Rules of Procedure provide that “[s]even mem-
bers . . . constitute a quorum of the Committee for purposes of transacting business.”  12
C.F.R. § 272.3(c) (2020).
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placed in or out of office directly by the President.  Instead, these bank presi-
dents are appointed and supervised by the Governors, who themselves have
only limited accountability to the President.
Although some commentators have questioned whether the Commit-
tee’s structure is so independent that it violates current Supreme Court pre-
cedent,62 one need not spend long on those arguments here.  Governors
enjoy tenure protections based on the President’s ability to remove them
only for cause before the end of their fourteen-year terms, and this structure
aligns with limitations on executive removal power approved by the Supreme
Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.63  There, the Court validated a
materially identical independent agency structure when it upheld a statute
granting for-cause protections from removal to officers who served fixed
terms on the Federal Trade Commission.64  In turn, the Governors’ ability to
remove Federal Reserve bank presidents at will provides a constitutionally
adequate level of presidential oversight for bank presidents.  In Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the Court approved an analo-
gous arrangement granting SEC Commissioners power to remove Account-
ing Oversight Board members at will.65  The Court found that this structure
62 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 115, and appointments clause litigation, infra
note 67; see also Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1989) (arguing that Reserve
Bank presidents’ role also involves “problems raised by a delegation to private individu-
als”).  Concerns about checking the President’s power would not seem to be resolved by
studies emphasizing Congress’s role. See generally SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE
MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: HOW CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2017).
63 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619, 627–28 (1935) (affirming the
constitutionality of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s provision that Commissioners with
fixed terms “may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office” under 15 U.S.C. § 41); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988)
(“good cause” removal protection for a limited term independent counsel did not “unduly
trammel[ ] on executive authority” under Article II).
64 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28.  The Court distinguished Shurtleff v. United
States as a case in which the officer lacked a fixed term of office and might be understood
to possess “life tenure” absent the President’s ability to remove him for reasons other than
those provided by statute. Id. at 622–23 (citing Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311
(1903)).  Although Chief Justice Roberts recently authored a majority opinion suggesting
that Humphrey’s Executor does not authorize for-cause protections in agencies exercising
“significant executive power,” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct.
2183, 2192 (2020), Justice Kagan’s partial dissent countered that the Court had granted
Congress “broad discretion” to afford such protections “for almost a century.” Id. at 2236
(Kagan, J, concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part);
see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 (the legality of for-cause protections did not “turn on
whether” an official “is classified as ‘purely executive’”); id. at 689 n.28 (noting that “to
some degree” the “powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey’s Executor would at the pre-
sent time be considered ‘executive’”).  The suggestion that the Constitution forbids inde-
pendent, multimember agencies who wield executive power is inconsistent with the First
Congress’s decision to vest significant executive power in an independent Sinking Fund
Commission. See infra discussion surrounding note 188.
65 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010).
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would provide adequate “[p]residential oversight,” because the President
would possess as much control over Accounting Oversight Board members as
he had over SEC Commissioners, who were presumed to be removable by the
President only for cause.66
On the Appointments Clause question, a series of cases brought in the
1970–80s addressed whether Federal Reserve bank presidents could serve on
the Committee without appointments as principal officers.  None of these
cases held that the bank presidents’ presence on the Committee violated the
Appointments Clause,67 and the lone district court to rule on the merits did
not require presidents to be appointed as principal officers.68  Although the
district court determined that Reserve Bank presidents exercised “vast pow-
ers” akin to those of principal officers when they served on the Committee,69
the quasi-private nature of their open market operations meant that these
duties could “be performed by private individuals” and not just officers of the
United States.70  Further, the five Federal Reserve presidents on the Commit-
tee have no power to bind the government or issue final Committee purchas-
ing decisions without the Governors, who are properly appointed principal
officers.  The Governors’ participation is required by the Committee’s proce-
dural rules, which mandate a quorum of seven committee members “for pur-
poses of transacting business.”71
These challenges to the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve pale in
comparison to originalist arguments for broader executive power to remove
66 Id. (invalidating for-cause removal protections for Board members and approving a
structure in which the SEC Commissioners could fire Board members at will).
67 All court of appeals decisions based their rulings on lack of standing or equitable
grounds for declining to reach the merits of the constitutional argument. See Comm. for
Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 542–44 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (holding that businesses’ and individuals’ financial harm from high interest
rates was not “fairly traceable” to Reserve Bank president’s actions); accord Reuss v. Balles,
584 F.2d 461, 467, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives and bondholder did not have particular or redressable injury).  Two other courts
relied on equitable grounds when they declined to hear Senators’ suits based on inability
to vote on confirmation of bank presidents. See Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836
F.2d 561, 565 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
68 See Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 (1986), aff’d on other
grounds, 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
69 Id. at 519.
70 Id. at 523.
71 12 C.F.R. § 272.3(c) (2020).  The exception permitting a smaller quorum when the
Committee has “fewer than seven members in office,” id., has never eliminated participa-
tion of Governors, and, as of 2017, the number of Governors has never dipped below four,
Federal Reserve System: Rules of Organization, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,496, 55,496 n.4 (Nov. 22,
2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 265).  At the very least, Governors’ ability to supervise
bank presidents through removal at will and quorum requirements suggests that bank
presidents are inferior officers “whose work is directed and supervised at some level” by the
Governors.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010)
(quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).
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and appoint members of the Open Market Committee.  Originalist argu-
ments go to the heart of the Committee’s independent structure, and they
are no longer purely academic.  In Seila Law, the Supreme Court recently
invalidated the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s independent struc-
ture as a “historical anomaly.”72  Much of the controversy focused on the fact
that the Bureau was run by a single independent director, rather than the
multimember structure typical of other independent agencies.  In his major-
ity opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that Humphrey’s Executor did not per-
mit “an independent agency led by a single Director and vested with
significant executive power.”73  Roberts instead recognized the President’s
power to remove the Bureau’s director at will pursuant to a general rule,
which Roberts based on “text, first principles, the First Congress’s decision in
1789” and other precedent.74
Justice Thomas joined this opinion in relevant part and also wrote a sep-
arate opinion, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch.  Justice Thomas’s opin-
ion touched on historical sources and urged the Court to overrule
Humphrey’s Executor as “an unfortunate example of the Court’s failure to
apply the Constitution as written.”75  Justice Kagan’s partial dissent argued
that text and originalist sources pointed in the opposite direction.  She
accused the majority of “second-guess[ing] . . . the wisdom of the Framers
and the judgment of history,”76 especially considering that the “First Con-
gress gave officials handling financial affairs . . . some independence from
the President.”77 Seila Law thus illustrates the primacy of originalism on the
Supreme Court, as well as the majority’s willingness to apply originalist argu-
ments to limit or eliminate the removal protections validated in Humphrey’s
Executor.  The Part below provides background on originalist arguments
against independent agencies and how they have been applied to the Federal
Reserve.
II. ORIGINALIST CHALLENGES
Originalists dispute the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve’s Open
Market Committee.  They argue that the President’s inability to remove or
72 Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 (2020).
73 Id. at 2201.  This part of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion was joined by Justices Kava-
naugh, Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch.
74 Id. at 2206.  As noted below, infra sub-subsection II.A.4.a, the Decision of 1789
reflects the First Congress’s prominent debate about the President’s power to remove the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
75 Id. at 2212 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Lucia v.
SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(following the “original public meaning of ‘Officers of the United States’” in a decision
involving the Appointments Clause).
76 Seila, 140 S. Ct at 2226.
77 Id. at 2230 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and
dissenting in part).  Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg joined Justice Kagan’s
opinion.
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otherwise direct decisions made by Committee members conflicts with the
original decision to vest Article II’s “executive power” in a single President of
the United States.  In addition, the President’s inability to appoint Commit-
tee members who are presidents of Federal Reserve banks may also conflict
with the original understanding of the Appointments Clause.  The discussion
below addresses removal powers and Appointments Clause concerns in turn.
A. Original Removal Power
Originalists have argued that the Open Market Committee’s structure
unconstitutionally limits the President’s constitutional power to direct
subordinate officers by firing them at will.  As explained by Steven Calabresi
and Christopher Yoo, the original “Constitution creates a unitary executive to
ensure energetic enforcement of the law and to promote accountability.”78
This unitary structure “eliminates conflicts in . . . regulatory policy by ensur-
ing” that federal agencies “will execute the law . . . in accordance with the
president’s wishes.”79
Originalists have not based these arguments exclusively on the constitu-
tional text.  The “executive Power” that Article II vests in the President is
vague,80 and leading originalists, including Justice Scalia, have acknowledged
that Article II does not specify an executive removal power as the mechanism
by which the President can effectuate a unitary executive policy.81  Hence
originalists tend to bolster unitary executive arguments with understandings
of early historical practice, such as the assertion there were “no independent
agencies in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century” North America.82  On this
view, independent agencies like the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Commit-
tee have been seen as “modern institutions” that cannot be grounded “in the
original meaning of the constitutional text.”83
The Sinking Fund Commission marks a jarring departure from this
understanding of early historical practice, as its multimember structure and
protections from removal display a much greater level of independence than
previously contemplated.  Originalist scholarship to date has not included a
robust discussion of the independent structure of the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion, and this omission may best be explained by a progression in originalist
thought.  Originalism itself reflects a sophisticated and evolving family of the-
78 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 3.
79 Id.
80 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (arguing “executive power” is a “vague” phrase which
admits of borderline cases).
81 There is “no provision in the Constitution stating who may remove executive
officers, except the provisions for removal by impeachment.”  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 723 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Adminis-
trative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1244 n.74 (1994).
82 Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 859.
83 Id. at 831.
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ories, and the “recognizably originalist” emphasis on “text” and “history”84 in
prominent judicial opinions and nascent originalist theory from the 1980s
and 1990s rests on a relatively general overview of textual and historical
evidence.
Only in recent decades have originalists conducted more detailed empir-
ical analysis of early historical practice, and this Article contributes to the
literature by unearthing previously overlooked evidence on the constitution-
ality of independent agencies.  The fact that an independent Sinking Fund
Commission was recommended by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Ham-
ilton, passed by the First Congress, and signed into law by President George
Washington provides occasion to reassess the governing originalist view of
Article II.  As explained below, the Sinking Fund Commission’s independent
structure is inconsistent with the unitary executive theory.  It shows that the
original originalists instead took a functional approach and allowed agencies
to possess significant independence from the President in the execution of
laws authorizing open market purchases.  The discussion below provides an
overview of developments in the originalist theory of a unitary executive.  It
then locates this Article’s empirical contribution as a more recent develop-
ment in the broader scholarly enterprise of ascertaining the original under-
standing of Article II.
1. Originalist Arguments in Leading Judicial Opinions
Leading jurists have relied on originalist arguments when finding for-
cause protections from removal inconsistent with the text of Article II and
early historical practice.  Originalists place great weight on Chief Justice
Taft’s 1926 opinion in Myers v. United States,85 which relied on Founding-era
history and the Decision of 1789 when rejecting restrictions on the Presi-
dent’s power to remove executive officers.  As noted by Chief Justice Taft,
however, the “exact question” voted on by the First Congress in the Decision
of 1789 “was whether it should recognize . . . the power of the President
under the Constitution to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without
the advice and consent of the Senate.”86  Likewise, the holding of Myers
involved a statute that required the Senate to approve the President’s
removal of an officer.  It did not address an independent, multimember
agency or a statute that vested a limited removal power in the President
alone.87
84 Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism?  The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist The-
ory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12,
16 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
85 272 U.S. 52, 106–177 (1926).
86 Id. at 114.
87 Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27
COLUM. L. REV. 353, 397 (1927) (noting that Myers does not “determine to any extent the
power of Congress to regulate tenure” and Chief Justice Taft’s “reasoning” on this point “is
not essential to the decision”).
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In 1988, when Morrison v. Olson required the Court to decide whether
Article II allowed Congress to impose substantive, “good cause” restrictions
on the executive’s ability to remove an independent counsel, Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion laid out the elegant constitutional argument for a unitary
executive: “the Founders conspicuously and very consciously declined to sap
the Executive’s strength in the same way they had weakened the Legislature:
by dividing the executive power” into multiple actors.88  Instead, Article II
vests power in a single executive actor: “The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States.”89  Justice Scalia explained, “this does not
mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”90  While a
President will necessarily rely on subordinate officers to carry out his or her
policies,91Article II’s Vesting and Take Care Clauses require that the Presi-
dent retain adequate control over these officers’ exercise of executive power,
which is generally thought to include execution of laws passed by Congress.92
Any time a subordinate exercises “purely executive power,” the statute can-
not “deprive the President of the United States of exclusive control over the
exercise of that power.”93
In Morrison, Justice Scalia determined that the investigative and
prosecutorial functions assigned to the independent counsel by the Ethics in
Government Act amounted to an exercise of “purely executive power.”94
Congress’s decision to grant the independent counsel for-cause protection
from removal deprived the President of “exclusive control” over her “quintes-
sentially executive” actions.95  Under Humphrey’s Executor, Scalia explained,
“limiting removal power to ‘good cause’ is an impediment to . . . Presidential
control.”96  Scalia argued that the independent counsel provisions violated
Article II, and he criticized the majority for departing from the “judgment of
the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people who approved
it.”97
Although Justice Scalia did not directly target Humphrey’s Executor or
other independent agencies in Morrison,98 unitary executivists have applied
88 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698–99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 705 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
90 Id. at 705.
91 PRAKASH, supra note 6, at 187 (noting President Washington’s understanding of
“[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of the
State”).
92 Id. at 65 (“Executive power was most closely associated with the power to execute
the law.”).
93 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 705–06.
95 Id. at 706.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 734.
98 Id. at 706–07 (distinguishing Humphrey’s Executor on the ground that the Court
found the FTC’s quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial work “‘wholly disconnected from the
executive department’” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630
(1935)).
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Scalia’s logic to attack the Federal Reserve and other independent agencies.
The problem, as in Morrison, rests in statutes granting heads of these agencies
independence from executive control through for-cause protections from
presidential removal.  Calabresi and Yoo tie this concern directly to the Fed-
eral Reserve’s independent structure, which leaves Presidents “largely with-
out power to affect monetary policy.”99  They urge Presidents to assert the
right to “legally fire holdover governors of the Federal Reserve Board”100 and
challenge decisions like Humphrey’s Executor as “unconstitutional limits on the
removal power” that “are inconsistent with the unitary executive.”101
As noted above, Seila Law took an important step in this direction.  Five
Justices held that the Decision of 1789, as interpreted by Chief Justice Taft in
Myers, precludes independent, single-member agencies that wield significant
executive power.102  These Justices may be poised to extend the holding
from Seila Law to similarly situated multimember agencies.103  It is less clear
that a majority of the Court is ready to invalidate the independent structure
of the Federal Reserve, however.  The majority in the Seila Law opinion held
open the possibility that the “Federal Reserve can claim a special historical
status.”104  Justice Kagan’s partial dissent supported Congress’s decision to
give “independence to financial regulators like the Federal Reserve
Board.”105  The Federal Reserve’s constitutional fate will thus turn on both
the continued viability of Humphrey’s Executor as well as the historical record
specific to the Federal Reserve.
2. Nascent Originalist Theory
Judicial critiques of independent agencies generally align with embry-
onic originalist research such as Geoffrey Miller’s 1986 critique of indepen-
dent agencies.106  Miller’s work exemplifies nascent originalist analysis.  It
focused on the “text of the Constitution” and “the history surrounding the
framing and original implementation of the system of separated powers.”107
Along with the text of Article II, Miller’s overview of historical practice
asserted that the Continental Congress had moved away from multimember
99 CALABRESI & YOO supra note 2, at 6.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 9.
102 Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201 (2020).
103 The Supreme Court will review the constitutionality of the independent Federal
Housing Finance Agency this term, after this Article goes to print. See Collins v. Mnuchin,
938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 2020 WL 3865248 (July 9, 2020)
(mem.).  The Agency’s single-headed structure makes it an unlikely vehicle for the Court
to address the constitutionality of multimember agency structures.
104 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2202 n.8.
105 Id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part).
106 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 696–97
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Miller for the proposition that
Humphrey’s Executor was “inconsistent with the text of the Constitution” and “with the
understanding of the text that largely prevailed from 1789 through 1935”).
107 Miller, supra note 2, at 57.
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boards and settled on “administrative management by single executive offi-
cials,” by the “time of the Constitution.”108  Miller’s historical overview also
declared multimember agencies with for-cause protections a novel “techno-
log[y] of government,”109 which did not become part of our Republic
“[b]efore the twentieth century.”110  Miller concluded that the “independent
agency is a constitutional sport,” or an anomaly “created without regard to
the basic principle of separation of powers upon which our government was
founded.”111
Other studies in the 1980s and 1990s questioned prevailing originalist
assumptions about early historical practice.  Harold Krent reported that Con-
gress sometimes granted prosecutorial power to private individuals or state
officials outside of the federal executive branch.112  Lawrence Lessig and
Cass Sunstein built on Krent’s work and related that “the authors of the origi-
nal practice . . . created a variety of structures” and “did not give the Presi-
dent plenary control” over all institutions created post-Founding.113  In
addition to a “number of settings” in which prosecutorial power and
“enforcement of the criminal law was placed beyond the control of the Presi-
dent,”114 other major departments such as Treasury lacked a structure consis-
tent with strong “presidential direction.”115
Unitary executivists Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash responded
by challenging their critics’ reliance on historical practice.  Calabresi and
Prakash argued that “postenactment behavior of the Congress” relied on by
these critics was not only an unreliable source of original public meaning,116
but also was likely to be biased in favor of Congress and stood at odds with
their unitary executivist construction of the Constitution’s “plain mean-
ing.”117  As explained below, however, their insistence on a particular con-
struction of the Constitution omitted important analytical steps that had not
yet been explicated by original public meaning scholars.
108 Id. at 69.
109 Id. at 72.
110 Id. at 65.
111 Id. at 96–97.
112 See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from
History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 296–309 (1989).
113 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 23.
114 Id. at 22.
115 Id. at 27–29 (discussing the independence of the Comptroller of Treasury and
Madison’s views on tenure for offices with “judicial qualities” (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
636 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
116 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 6, at 554.  This argument addresses “original public
meaning” but does not acknowledge the possibility of “constitutional underdeterminacy”
addressed by later original public meaning scholars.  Solum, supra note 84, at 23 (emphasis
omitted).
117 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 6, at 553–54.
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3. Original Public Meaning and the Underdetermined Nature of the Text
Around the same time unitary executivists defended their position based
on a particular construction of Article II, originalist theory itself was undergo-
ing a significant change.  While early studies searched for original intent,
Justice Scalia and several prominent scholars urged originalists to shift their
focus to original public meaning.118  Justice Scalia understood early histori-
cal practice to be an essential part of the inquiry into original public mean-
ing.  As he put it, the “understanding of the First Congress and of the leading
participants in the Constitutional Convention” offers a “contemporaneous
understanding of the President’s removal power.”119
The shift to original public meaning also inspired a more nuanced ana-
lytical framework.  Original public meaning scholars identified an important
distinction between constitutional interpretation, which “discern[s] the
semantic content of the Constitution,” and constitutional construction,
which “determin[es] the legal effect of the constitutional text.”120  This dis-
tinction requires the communicative content fixed by the text of Article II to
be identified through an “empirical inquiry” into linguistic and contextual
facts in the first instance.121  The preliminary focus on semantic content, or
meaning conveyed, operates independently of the ultimate “construction,”
which gives “legal effect” to the semantic content and may also be “justified
by normative considerations.”122  The text may admit a “range of acceptable
constructions” that are susceptible to “change over time,” so long as these
constructions stay “within the limits imposed by the original meaning of the
text.”123
Original public meaning scholars are not the only ones to emphasize
empirical analysis of historical evidence of meaning and communicative con-
tent.124  The public meaning inquiry overlaps with questions relevant to orig-
inal law,125 original intent,126 and original methods127 families of originalist
theory, and even nonoriginalist inquiries for which original meaning is rele-
118 See Solum, supra note 84, at 22–23.
119 Scalia, supra note 10, at 852.
120 Solum, supra note 84, at 23.
121 Solum, supra note 80, at 12 (noting that this interpretive inquiry typically turns on
linguistic and contextual facts, whereas the ultimate “construction” or “legal effect” will be
“justified by normative considerations”).
122 Id.; accord Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 108 (2010) (the “zone of underdeterminacy” left when evidence of linguistic
meaning has run out is the “construction zone”).
123 Id. at 117–18 (emphasis omitted).
124 See id. at 99; Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 65, 66 (2010) (“It cannot be overstressed that the activity of determining semantic
meaning at the time of enactment . . . is empirical . . . .”).
125 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV
1455, 1458 (2019) (“[T]o claim that, in fact, our original law actually permits or requires [a
thing] is to make an empirical and falsifiable claim . . . that has to be supported by histori-
cal evidence . . . .”).
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vant.128  Take the papers of Alexander Hamilton, a key source of historical
evidence relied on this Article.  Hamilton’s writings are a widely cited author-
ity on the original public meaning of the Constitution,129 and Hamilton’s
recommendations for an independent Commission became part of our origi-
nal law when they were enacted by Congress and the President.130  As Hamil-
ton was also a Framer, his views shed light on original intent.131  And as a
lawyer, Hamilton would also have understood the special legal meaning of
the Constitution.132  Thus, his interpretation and practice under the Consti-
tution would provide evidence relevant to an original-methods approach.
The bifurcated inquiry required to determine original public meaning
also calls into question earlier assumptions about the clarity with which the
text of Article II dictates a unitary executive and obviates the need to consult
evidence of historical practice.  Unadorned by construction, the raw text of
Article II presents both a vagueness and an ambiguity that appear impossible
to resolve based on direct textual interpretation.  Article II vests “[t]he execu-
tive power” in the President, but it does not explain “what executive power
is.”133  The open-textured nature of the phrase “executive power” renders it a
“vague” term that admits of borderline cases.134
Article II is also ambiguous because it has several gaps with respect to the
relationship between the President and officers who help execute the law.
These omissions stand in stark contrast to express provisions specifying the
President’s role in initial appointments to office.  The Article II Appoint-
126 See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM,
supra note 84, at 87 (“[T]he proper way to interpret the Constitution . . . is to seek its
authors’ intended meanings . . . .”).
127 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1400–11 (2018) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Language
of the Law].
128 See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 717–18 (2013); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349,
2403 (2015) (discussing nonoriginalist uses of original history).
129 Balkin, supra note 128, at 702 (writings of Framers such as Hamilton show “what the
text” of the Constitution “meant to a member of the lay public”).
130 Original law may be especially authoritative because it reflects not only Hamilton’s
views but also those of a majority of First Congress and President Washington.
131 Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403,
406 (1996) (noting that Framers such as Hamilton “knew what they were talking about”
and their “expertise, knowledge, and reflection influences us in a way that sheer majority
will cannot”).  The Framers’ expertise also explains why Hamilton and other Framers are
leading authorities on original public meaning.  Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The
Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (2018).
132 McGinnis & Rappaport, Language of the Law, supra note 127, at 1393 (stating that
after the Constitutional Convention, Framers such as Hamilton “continued to treat the
Constitution as written in the language of the law”).
133 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 244 (1996) (Article II “baldly” vested executive power in the President).
134 Solum, supra note 80, at 11.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 22  5-NOV-20 7:58
22 notre dame law review [vol. 96:1
ments Clause specifies two distinct presidential roles in initial appointments
to office: the President shares the power to appoint principal officers with the
Senate and may be one of three bodies in which appointment of an inferior
officer is vested by law.135  But Article II does not provide a list of executive
offices that the President may fill, much less spell out the relationship
between the President and executive officers after they have been appointed
to an office.136  The text is especially lacking when it comes to the President’s
removal power.  Article II fails to expressly assign the President a removal
power,137 explain why removal power ought to be the President’s primary
mechanism of control over executive officers, or explain how any presiden-
tial removal power relates to specific provisions granting Congress power to
remove officers through impeachment.  All of these omissions show that the
text of Article II severely underdetermines the President’s power to remove
executive officers.138  It leaves significant questions about Congress’s ability
to define attributes of executive offices and place limits on the President’s
control over executive officers.
The First Congress had to confront the ambiguity of Article II head-on
when it established the first great executive departments of government.  In
The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton had opined that the President’s removal
power would mirror the Appointments Clause and require the Senate to
approve the President’s decision to remove an officer.139  As recounted by
Chief Justice Taft, Hamilton’s view was not universally accepted but remained
part of a “division of opinion” expressed by lawyers, jurists, and members of
the First Congress shortly after ratification.140  In the deliberations leading
up to Congress’s initial resolution of these issues, known as the Decision of
1789, the First Congress spent “more than a month” debating four possible
constructions of the removal power with respect to officers in the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs.141  The Constitution’s “silence” on the issue of exec-
utive removal power led members of the House of Representatives to address
a broad range of arguments.142
At one extreme, Article II could mean the “grant of executive power
vested the President” with removal power that could not be restricted by Con-
135 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
136 Id.
137 See supra note 81; Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 166
(2017) (noting that text-based “originalist arguments about the removal power . . . are a
source of vague embarrassment”).
138 Solum, supra note 80, at 41 (stating “a legal text is underdeterminate” if the text
“produces outcomes for some but not all of the applications in the set”).
139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 12, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton); RAKOVE, supra
note 133, at 286 (noting that senatorial consent might “saddle[ ]” a new President “with
holdovers from the prior administration”).
140 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926).
141 Prakash, supra note 11, at 1023; see also Corwin, supra note 87, at 361.
142 JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN
THE FOUNDING ERA 133–37 (2018).
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gress.143  A more limited view of the President’s power might allow Congress
to choose whether or not to delegate unrestricted removal power to the Pres-
ident.  Even more restrictive views might require the Senate to approve the
President’s decision to remove an officer, as had been suggested by Hamil-
ton, or hold that the Congress lacked power to supplement the text’s provi-
sion for removal of officers though impeachment.144  This final view would
give the President no more power to remove executive officers than he had
to remove independent Article III judges, and raised concerns that it would
provide no recourse against officers’ “all-too-common ‘total neglect of the
duties’ of office.”145
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton both had a “change of heart”
regarding the President’s removal power and embraced more expansive
views of the executive power after this debate was underway.146  The variety
of possible meanings and changes in viewpoints all establish Article II’s ambi-
guity.  The text of Article II encompassed multiple possible meanings with
respect to executive removal power, and it failed to communicate a single
meaning fixed by the text of the Constitution at the time it “was framed and
ratified.”147  The construction settled on by the First Congress identified a
presidential removal power and rejected two of the more restrictive views of
removal power (that removal required senatorial approval or impeachment).
The construction adopted in the Decision of 1789 did not, however, elimi-
nate all underlying ambiguity in the text of the Constitution.
4. Recovering Original Meaning and Law Through Evidence of Early
Historical Practice
a. The Decision of 1789
Given the inherent vagueness and ambiguity of the text of Article II,
leading originalists have emphasized early historical practice as evidence of
original meaning.148  This analysis typically focuses on deliberations and
143 Prakash, supra note 11, at 1023.
144 GIENAPP, supra note 142.
145 Id. at 133 (quoting Theodore Sedgwick, June 16 and 22, 1789, in 11 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4,
1789–MARCH 3, 1791, at 865 (Linda Grant De Pauw, Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R.
Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1976)).
146 Prakash, supra note 11, at 1038 n.121 (noting that Hamilton retreated from his
earlier call for senatorial approval); id. at 1039 (“Though Madison began as a partisan of
the congressional-delegation theory, he eventually came to denounce it.”).
147 Solum, supra note 80, at 29; see William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 15 (2019) (noting that liquidation was needed to resolve ambiguity as to presiden-
tial removal power).
148 Evidence of historical practice is relevant to the interpretive inquiry focused on orig-
inal public meaning.  Balkin, supra note 128, at 656–57 (explaining that “post-ratification
history” may “shed light on adoption history”); Barnett, supra note 124, at 71 (“[H]istorical
context usually allows us to identify which of multiple competing senses of a term is its
most likely public meaning.”).
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enactments in which the First Congress created the initial machinery of gov-
ernment under the Constitution, and originalists’ detailed analysis of the
removal debate leading up to the Decision of 1789 is a prominent exam-
ple.149  Part of this prominence reflects the “privileged” interpretive status
that jurists have accorded to the First Congress’s practices as actions that
“reflect” the Constitution’s original meaning.150  As the First Congress acted
on the heels of ratification, its understandings are generally thought to offer
“weighty” and “contemporaneous” evidence of the Constitution’s original
meaning.151  This body also had many members who “had helped to com-
pose or to ratify the Constitution itself,”152 and so the First Congress was
exceptionally well situated to grasp the Constitution’s original public
meaning.
All Founding-era statutes incorporate, at least implicitly, Congress’s and
the President’s interpretations of the Constitution with respect to the particu-
lar structure enacted.  The enactment of legislation reflects the First Con-
gress’s and President’s understanding that the laws fall within the bounds of
linguistic meaning established by the text of the Constitution.153  For exam-
ple, the decision to exclude senatorial approval of the President’s removal
decisions in the Decision of 1789 provides evidence, in the form of an origi-
nal law, that the Constitution did not require senatorial approval.154  Original
law can play a powerful role within originalist analysis, especially in areas
where the text provides minimal cues.  If the First Congress and President
Washington had enacted the mirror image of the FTC, for example, it is
doubtful originalists would challenge the constitutionality of the FTC’s struc-
ture today.
That is not to say the “reflected light” of historical practice provides per-
fect evidence of constitutional meaning.155  The norm of reason-giving appli-
149 Prakash, supra note 11; Scalia, supra note 10, at 851–52 (“[Myers] is a prime exam-
ple of what . . . is known as the ‘originalist’ approach to constitutional interpretation.  The
objective . . . was to establish the meaning of the Constitution, in 1789, regarding the
presidential removal power.”).
150 Baude, supra note 147, at 61–62.
151 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.
of New Orleans, 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888)); see also supra note 10.
152 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 4.
153 See Balkin, supra note 128, at 657 (“[P]ractices of the Washington Administration
immediately after adoption of the Constitution are generally . . . relevant to understanding
the original meaning of Article II.”); Baude, supra note 147, at 61–62 (noting that post-
Founding practices have “interpretive relevance” because they “can reflect some informa-
tion about the Constitution’s original meaning”).
154 In this sense, the Decision of 1789 and resulting legislation offer helpful precedent
on the initial interpretive question of the linguistic meaning of the Constitution.  The
Decision is better known as creating another type of precedent on the separate question of
constitutional construction and whether the Constitution should be construed to permit the
Senate to approve Presidential removals in other cases. See infra text surrounding note
164–65.
155 Baude, supra note 147, at 61–62 (quoting William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Emi-
nent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811 (2013)).
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cable to judicial opinions does not generally extend to legislative and
executive actions in the political branches.  One cannot always expect early
legislative and executive decisions to provide the same constitutional reason-
ing one would expect to see in a judicial opinion.156  For this type of evi-
dence, actions often speak louder than words.  New legislation itself requires
the approval of both Congress and the President (or at least a supermajority
of Congress),157 and one may be even more confident of interbranch
approval when the executive branch itself was the body to propose a restric-
tion on executive power (as was the case with the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion).  While there is always the chance that such agreement reflects only
“acquiescence” in an arrangement that is more convenient or politically
desirable than it is constitutional,158 the First Congress and the first Presi-
dent seem especially unlikely to ignore or overlook constitutional
requirements.
A leading originalist scholar has praised the First Congress’s debates
over the meaning of the Constitution,159  and noted that this body
“seem[ed] unlikely” to “casually toss aside . . . constitutional scruples merely
to satisfy their policy preferences.”160  James Madison, for example, was
extremely self-conscious about how his work as a member of the First Con-
gress would set the stage for later government practices.161  President Wash-
ington manifested a similar concern when he “devoutly wished” that initial
“precedents” reflecting the creation and administration of government “be
fixed on true principles.”162  Unlike later practices supported by interbranch
acquiescence,163 one cannot plausibly argue that the First Congress and Pres-
ident Washington were ignorant or had forgotten the basic structural
requirements of the Constitution.  Given trepidations that leading figures
such as Madison and Washington voiced over precedent, it would be surpris-
ing if they were suddenly willing to bargain away constitutional requirements
in order to create initial structures of government.
156 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366–67
(1978) (stating “[w]e demand of an adjudicative decision” a “decision which is the product
of reasoned argument” and “a kind of rationality we do not expect of the results of . . .
voting”).
157 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
158 Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 686–95
(2016) (describing how political branches’ acquiescence in a particular constitutional
practice may reflect ignorance, politics, or coercion).
159 Prakash, supra note 11, at 1045.
160 Id.
161 See Baude, supra note 147, at 9–10 (noting Madison’s concerns).  Although initial
practice would not have established the “[c]ourse of deliberate practice” required to create
a binding line of precedent, Madison also obsessed over the initial creation of government
and its potential to lay the groundwork for a settled course of practice in the future.  Id. at
16, 61.
162 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 57 (quoting Letter from George Washington to
James Madison (May 5, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 131, 132 (Charles F.
Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979)).
163 See generally Roisman, supra note 158.
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Under this framework, the Decision of 1789 has provided the leading
originalist precedent on executive removal power.  As noted above, the delib-
erations leading up to this decision show textual ambiguity surrounding the
President’s removal power.  The First Congress resolved some of the ambigu-
ity in favor of a construction that created a stronger executive structure and
did not subject the President’s removal decisions to senatorial approval or
leave the issue solely to Congress through impeachment.  Its decision marked
the beginning of a long period of “acquiescence” in which “there was no act
of Congress, no executive act, and no decision of this Court” subjecting the
President’s removal power to senatorial approval.164  Only later on did the
original constitutional ambiguity give way to further disputes, when Congress
decided to include senatorial approval provisions in its 1867 Tenure of Office
Act and the House impeached President Andrew Johnson for violating the
Act’s requirements.165  In Myers, the Supreme Court ultimately resolved the
dispute by following the construction adopted by the First Congress.
The Decision of 1789 fails to resolve many other important questions
about executive removal power.  While the First Congress clearly rejected a
constitutional requirement of senatorial approval, scholars disagree whether
the decision to give the President unfettered removal power ultimately
turned on a constitutional or congressional grant of removal power to the
President.166  The Decision does not address whether Congress may restrict
the grounds upon which a President may unilaterally remove an officer.  Nor
does it address all types of domestic officers, multimember structures, or
other officers who could “not be classified as purely executive.”167
Perhaps these distinctions are less important than other things the First
Congress did not do when establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs.
While one may debate whether the Decision of 1789 enshrined a unitary
executive, no one argues that the resulting legislation created an affirmative
precedent in favor of independent agencies.  The First Congress did not
enact key attributes of structural independence for the Department of For-
eign Affairs, such as a multimember structure or a provision limiting the
President’s power to remove its officers.168  The perceived lack of original
precedent for these independent structural attributes is a fundamental rea-
son originalists have condemned independent agency structures such as the
Federal Reserve.  But as explained below, the existing debate reflects a
myopic focus on the Decision of 1789 and has largely overlooked crucial his-
164 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926).
165 Id. at 166.
166 Compare Prakash, supra note 11, at 1067 (“Congress decided that the President had
a constitutional right to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.”), with CURRIE, supra note
9, at 41 (noting that this dispute culminated in legislation permitting the Secretary to be
removed by the President, but with “no consensus as to whether” the president’s authority
derived “from Congress or from the Constitution itself”), and Corwin, supra note 87, at 369
(those who regarded removal as an “incident of ‘executive power’” were a “minority of a
minority”).
167 Prakash, supra note 11, at 1071.
168 See Barkow, supra note 20, at 26.
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torical evidence of the executive and legislative branches’ approval of an
independent structure for the Sinking Fund Commission.
b. The Independence of Obscure Domestic Commissions
While independent agencies have suffered from a perceived lack of pre-
cedent,169 this perception has more to do with the incomplete state of histor-
ical research than actual historical practice.  The magnitude of a broader
empirical inquiry into early historical practices may help explain why histori-
cal research is incomplete.  Decades ago, before the advent of advanced
search technology, Justice Scalia predicted that examination of the “contem-
poraneous understanding of the President’s removal power,” along with
other important background materials, “might well take thirty years and
7,000 pages.”170  In the academic literature, a comprehensive study of early
historical practices regarding domestic officers had not been completed by
the early aughts.  And Jennifer Mascott completed her groundbreaking study
of original meaning and historical practice for appointments of federal
officers only very recently.171
The incomplete historical record explains why Jerry Mashaw expected to
find a “largely open and unpopulated” field of early administrative institu-
tions when he began a historical inquiry just over a decade and a half ago.172
Instead he found that the “volume one of  the Statutes at Large” created
“multiple regulatory schemes” that “others have largely ignored.”173  Impor-
tantly, Mashaw’s research on the First Congress’s enactments identified a
handful of early instances in which “Congress experimented with indepen-
dent boards and commissions.”174  In addition to noting the Sinking Fund
Commission, Mashaw explained that “Congress created commissions and
boards outside of any of the major departments to oversee the Mint . . . and
to rule on patent applications.”175
Mashaw emphasized the independence reflected in Congress’s decision
to bypass an additional appointments process and create commissions and
boards that “were made up of already existing officers of the United
States.”176  For example, the Sinking Fund Commission and committee to
inspect coinage at the Mint both included the Chief Justice, Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of State, and the Attorney General.177  Congress’s “first
statute authorizing the issuance of patents” made “the Secretary of State, Sec-
169 Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 859.
170 Scalia, supra note 10, at 852.
171 See supra note 3.
172 MASHAW, supra note 6, at viii.
173 Id.
174 Mashaw, supra note 6, at 1340.
175 Id. at 1291.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1301.  The committee to inspect coinage at the Mint also included the Comp-
troller of the Treasury and the Sinking Fund Commission included the President of the
Senate and Vice President.  Id. at 1301–02.
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retary of War, and the Attorney General into the Patent Office.”178  Mashaw
also explained that Congress did not give the President authority to replace
all of the officers assigned to these bodies: “Some of these ex-officio commis-
sioners could be replaced by the President by replacing the officers.  But
other Boards of Commissioners contained non-removable officials like the
Chief Justice and the President of the Senate.”179
Mashaw’s discovery of independent commissions has not led unitary
executivists to abandon their preferred construction of Article II.  Their
objections challenge the extent to which the Sinking Fund Commission and
similar bodies were truly independent of executive control.  According to
Calabresi and Yoo, neither the Sinking Fund Commission nor other indepen-
dent commissions described by Mashaw were “described as being indepen-
dent in the statutes that created them,” and these commissions still included
a majority of “executive branch members” who “were obviously removable at
will.”180
Sai Prakash suggests that the Sinking Fund Commission was subject to a
different type of presidential control than removal power.  Prakash notes that
the Act creating the Sinking Fund Commission “expressly authorized the
president to approve the commissioners’ decisions” to purchase U.S. securi-
ties.181  He claims that this provision allowed the President to “direct” the
Chief Justice and other Commissioners “in their executive capacities,” even
though Commissioners like the Chief Justice “could not be removed from
office, because they did not formally occupy a separate executive office.”182
Aditya Bamzai has recently reiterated these arguments.  He asserts that both
approbation and removal at will ensured presidential control of the Sinking
Fund Commission.183
Taken together, the distinctions raised by Calabresi, Yoo, Prakash, and
Bamzai raise further questions about the amount of control the President
had over the Sinking Fund Commission.  If the President had complete con-
trol over the Commission based on his power to remove a majority of Com-
missioners at will, then why did Congress include additional provisions
requiring the President to approve purchases authorized by a majority of the
Commission?  Indeed, why even bother with a multimember Commission
when a single executive officer such as the Secretary of the Treasury would
seem far better suited to effectuate the President’s wishes?  And did the Presi-
dent’s power to approve the Commission’s purchases give him the same con-
trol he would have had if the functions of the Commission were assigned to
the Secretary of the Treasury or a single officer he could remove at will?
178 Id. at 1302 (citing An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109
(1790) (repealed 1793)).
179 Id. at 1291.
180 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 53.
181 PRAKASH, supra note 6, at 279–80 (noting that the Sinking Fund Commission was
one instance in which “early chief justices served as executive officers”).
182 Id. at 280–81.
183 Bamzai, supra note 6, at 1339.
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A final wrinkle is whether the open market purchases conducted by the
Commission were quasi-private activities that fell outside the removal and
appointments requirements for officers exercising executive power under
Article II.  Calabresi and Yoo, for example, compare the Federal Reserve to
the Bank of the United States,184 but they do not offer a detailed comparison
between the Bank’s operation pursuant to a federal corporate charter and
the Federal Reserve’s open market purchases pursuant to a statutory man-
date.  The Bank of the United States was originally conceived of as a private
institution by Alexander Hamilton,185 was statutorily barred from purchasing
U.S. securities,186 and did not execute a clearly enumerated sovereign power
pursuant to its corporate charter.187  By contrast, open market purchases
made by the Federal Reserve and Sinking Fund Commission have been
expressly authorized by statute and execute laws that effectuate sovereign
powers to “regulate the Value” of money (for the Federal Reserve) or “pay
the Debts” (for the Commission) under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion.188  Thus the functions of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Commit-
tee and the Sinking Fund Commission cannot be set aside as quasi-private
functions that fall outside of Article II’s general requirements.  The constitu-
tional debate turns squarely on the above questions about the Sinking Fund
Commission’s independence from presidential control in its exercise of exec-
utive power.
This Article sets forth historical evidence addressing these questions in
Part III, below.  The evidence establishes that the Sinking Fund Commission
possessed much more independence than unitary executivists have recog-
nized.  Historical practice provides compelling evidence that the Constitu-
tion allows Congress to limit the President’s control over officials who
execute statutes effectuating enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8.
The Commission’s open market purchases executed statutes involving a sov-
ereign power to “pay the Debts” under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
184 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 54.
185 Bamzai, supra note 6, at 1341 (recounting Hamilton’s argument that the Bank “shall
be under a private not a public Direction”).
186 Congress established the First Bank as a corporate body allowed to sell but not
purchase public debt. See An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United
States, ch. 10, § 7, 1 Stat. 191, 193 (1791) (“The said corporation may sell any part of the
public debt whereof its stock shall be composed, but shall not be at liberty to purchase any
public debt whatsoever . . . .”).
187 GIENAPP, supra note 142, at 202–47 (recounting debate over sovereign authority to
establish the Bank of the United States).
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Article I, Section 8 enumerates legislative powers the execu-
tion of which Congress may delegate to the executive branch. Id.  Execution of laws on
payment of debt or regulating the value of money falls within both the “thick” and “thin”
understandings of executive power. See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause,
167 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5) (stating that under a thin view, the
“executive power meant the power to execute.  Period.”); Ilan Wurman, In Search of Preroga-
tive, 70 DUKE L.J. 93, 137 (2020) (stating that a thick understanding of the executive power
includes “power to execute law”).
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tion.  Yet the President lacked complete control over the Sinking Fund
Commission’s exercise of that power.
B. Original Appointments Clause Requirements
Originalist scholars have also questioned whether current precedent has
unduly narrowed the President’s role under the Appointments Clause.  The
Constitution does not guarantee the President an opportunity to appoint an
officer unless that individual is both a principal officer as well as an official
who exercises significant authority of the United States.  Originalist scholars
have questioned the Supreme Court’s dividing line between principal and
inferior officers as well as the Court’s dividing line between officers of the
United States and employees or other officials who need not be appointed
pursuant to Article II.
Gary Lawson has questioned the established dividing line between prin-
cipal and inferior officers.  As noted in Edmond v. United States,189 this test
turns on a hierarchical relationship, and “officers who do not answer to other
officers” are principal officers.190  Lawson points out, however, that even
subordinate officials might still be “principal officers because of the nature
and scope of their authority.”191  In other words, “[a]nswerability to another
officer is a necessary condition of inferior officer status, but it is not necessarily
a sufficient condition.”192  Lawson cites evidence from the Founding era to
support this dual definition: while “inferior” primarily encompassed a hierar-
chical relationship, this term was sometimes used to connote “scope of
authority” instead.193  Under this alternative understanding of the term
“inferior,” one might conclude that the “enormous power” possessed by an
entity such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board  would pre-
vent Board members from qualifying as inferior officers.194
Lawson candidly admits that evidence of original meaning on this point
is “very thin.”195  Still, his argument touches on the problems Peter Conti-
Brown has raised with regard to the Open Market Committee.  Even though
bank presidents may technically be controlled by and inferior to Governors
on the Committee, at Committee meetings these bank “presidents’ votes
count the same as those of their would-be superiors” on the Board of Gover-
nors.196  And the Committee’s monetary policy decisions have significant
effects on the national economy.  In the lone district court case addressing
the constitutionality of bank presidents’ appointments to the Committee,
189 520 U.S. 651, 662–663 (1997).
190 Lawson, supra note 3, at 77.
191 Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 79 (noting the Board’s power “to regulate virtually every aspect of the public
auditing process”).
195 Id. at 80 (developing further argument regarding heads of separately organized
departments).
196 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 2, at 113.
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Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, the court noted that members of the
Open Market Committee exercised “vast powers” akin to those of principal
officers when they cast their votes at committee meetings.197  It would be
difficult to argue that the Committee’s decisions have a trivial effect on the
national economy.  Instead, it may be that the scope and nature of the Open
Market Committee’s decisions are sufficiently important that everyone voting
on the Committee should be considered a principal officer.
The district court in Melcher avoided the principal officer question when
it held that the bank presidents’ participation in the Open Market Commit-
tee did not amount to an impermissible exercise of authority of the United
States under Buckley v. Valeo.198  The Court relied on the fact that the Com-
mittee did not have power to bind third parties, because it did “not direct the
conduct of anyone other than its own members.”199  Jennifer Mascott has
recently challenged this aspect of Buckley’s governing “significant authority”
test on originalist grounds.  As she notes, “historical evidence suggests that
the most likely eighteenth century meaning of ‘officer’ was significantly
broader than the modern ‘significant authority’ test implies.”200  Rather than
distinguishing between discretionary or ministerial functions, “[i]n the
Founding era, the term ‘officer’ was commonly understood to encompass any
individual who had ongoing responsibility for a governmental duty.”201  Mas-
cott argues that this definition includes some officials who do not have the
power to bind third parties outside the government with the force of law,
given that the First Congress “appointed as officers the clerks who engaged
merely in tasks like recording the receipt of registration certificates from
merchant ships importing goods.”202
As one would expect of an empirical study reflecting historical practice,
Mascott’s research does not uncover a perfectly uniform practice with respect
to congressionally mandated appointments.  She acknowledges several gov-
ernmental actors for whom the appointments process does not reflect a
broader understanding of the term “officer.”  In cases where the non-officer
had the power to bind third parties, the exceptions often reflected instances
where multiple governmental actors shared primary responsibility for the
same decision, and a properly appointed officer retained significant responsi-
bility for the non-officer’s exercise of sovereign power.  This shared responsi-
bility may reflect the fact that the non-officer acts as a principal officer’s
197 644 F. Supp. 510, 519 (D.D.C. 1986).
198 Id. at 520, 523 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
199 Id. at 523 n.26.
200 Mascott, supra note 3, at 450.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 462; see also Lucia v. SEC., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2062–63 (2018) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in judgment and dissenting in part) (noting Congress’s provision of an officer-level
appointments process “supports” but does not decide that “Congress viewed the position as
one to be held by an ‘Officer’. . . .”).
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agent, or the requirement that a principal officer assumes personal liability
for the non-officer’s binding actions.203
These exceptions raise questions about how originalists would categorize
the actions of Federal Reserve bank presidents on the Open Market Commit-
tee.  On the one hand, their votes involve ongoing responsibility for a govern-
mental duty.  On the other hand, Federal Reserve bank presidents share
primary responsibility for open market operations with the Governors, who
are properly appointed principal officers.  Although presidents of Federal
Reserve banks do not act as Governors’ agents on the Committee, the Com-
mittee’s voting and quorum requirements prevent presidents from initiating
any open market operations without the Governors’ consent.204
The exception identified by Mascott raises significant questions as to
whether or not originalists would view open market purchases by a multi-
member Commission as actions that must be assigned exclusively to officers
appointed in accordance with Article II.205  The First Congress’s decision to
empower the Sinking Fund Commission to purchase U.S. securities in fur-
therance of statutorily defined goals provides helpful precedent on this issue.
As explained in more detail below, Congress’s decision to designate the
Chief Justice as an ex officio Commissioner—without any separate appoint-
ment to an executive branch office—suggests that Appointments Clause
requirements do not apply to members of an agency who share decision-
making authority with properly appointed principal officers.
III. THE CREATION AND OPERATION OF THE SINKING FUND COMMISSION
Until now, studies of early historical practice have not included an in-
depth analysis of the independence of the Sinking Fund Commission.  The
Commission’s open market purchases of U.S. securities pursuant to statutory
mandates are the same actions the Federal Open Market Committee can take
when it wishes to expand the money supply today.  The Sinking Fund Com-
mission arose in a historical context in which open market purchases were
needed to prop up the value of fledgling U.S. securities and provide a viable
framework for financing repayment of the national debt.  The Sinking Fund
Commission was a critical part of Alexander Hamilton’s plan to secure U.S.
credit and provide a sound plan for financing a burgeoning national debt by
203 Mascott, supra note 3, at 517 (agency relationships); id. at 522 (noting that the
deputy was not treated as an officer “[w]here the primary officer” was personally liable “for
the deputy’s misdeeds”).
204 See supra discussion surrounding note 61.  While Mascott noted a further exception
for the Bank of the United States and its operation by bank directors who were appointed
outside of any Article II process, Mascott, supra note 3, at 531, the quasi-private nature of
Bank operations does not apply to the Sinking Fund Commission or Open Market Com-
mittee’s purchases and execution of sovereign government functions.
205 Mascott’s general survey of new officers appointed to various Commissions does not
address the ex officio Commissioners discussed here.  This may be because her survey of
“personnel expenditures” would not necessarily link any additional expenditures to ex
officio service in a second governmental office.  Mascott, supra note 3, at 509–10.
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issuing new U.S. securities.206  The discussion below lays out the background
of the Sinking Fund Commission as it was recorded in the writings of Alexan-
der Hamilton,207 reports of debate and legislation adopted by the First Con-
gress,208 and Commission meeting records or correspondence authored by
Commissioners Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, John Adams, and Thomas
Jefferson.209
A. Secretary Hamilton’s Proposal
The Constitution bound our new nation to honor preexisting debt,210
much of which reflected the high “price of liberty,”211 namely, foreign and
domestic loans taken out to fund the Revolutionary War.  To add to these
concerns, some states also retained significant war debts from their common
defense efforts, and collection of funds to repay state debt threatened to
compete with federal efforts to collect funds for the national debt.212  By
1790, the overall amount of debt was so large that “the country could not
have redeemed debt” with current levels of revenue, and “it was dicey
whether the United States could cover even the interest on its debt.”213  Con-
206 RICHARD SYLLA & DAVID J. COWEN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON ON FINANCE, CREDIT, AND
DEBT 78 (2018).
207 Hamilton’s writings include reports submitted to Congress as well as his official cor-
respondence.  Unless otherwise noted, the Hamilton papers cited in this study are drawn
from the National Archive’s National Historical Publications and Records Commission’s
National Archives: Founders Online, available at https://founders.archives.gov/about. This
collection has the advantage of including “documents authored and received by, or related
to, individual leaders of the period,” as well as “transcriptions of thousands of documents
that have not yet appeared in the published volumes” of existing collections. About Foun-
ders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/about (last
visited Sept. 30, 2020).  The Hamilton Papers in the National Archive collection are identi-
cal to those gathered in the Rotunda database subscription. See E-mail from David Sewell,
Manager of Digital Initatives, Univ. of Va. Press, to Christine Chabot, Associate Director for
Regulation, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and Distinguished Scholar in Resi-
dence, Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. L. (Apr. 11, 2019, 8:51 AM) (on file with the author). See
generally William Baude & Jud Campbell, Early American Constitutional History: A Source
Guide 28 (last updated Nov. 2, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2718777) (discussing Rotunda database).
208 Reports of congressional debates are drawn from the Annals of Congress.
209 Meeting records and correspondence are drawn from the National Archives: Founders
Online collection described above in note 207.
210 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
211 Alexander Hamilton, Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit (1790),
reprinted in 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2043 (1790).  This Article uses the version of the Annals
paginated according to the “Gales & Seaton’s History of Debates in Congress” headings
that is available on the Library of Congress website. See Baude & Campbell, supra note 207
(manuscript at 12).  Hamilton’s January 9, 1790 Report appears in an Appendix to Volume
2 of this version of the Annals of Congress.
212 See SYLLA & COWEN, supra note 206, at 72 (explaining the goal of reducing competi-
tion for resources between federal and state governments).
213 Richard Sylla & Jack W. Wilson, Sinking Funds as Credible Commitments: Two Centuries
of US National-Debt Experience, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 199, 208, 212 (1999).
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gress asked Hamilton to “devise a plan to repay the nation’s debts,”214 and he
submitted a Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public
Credit.215  This Report outlined an extensive plan for refinancing state and
federal debts and issuing new U.S. securities to meet current obligations to
pay interest on existing debt.  Hamilton’s plan offered to maintain the
United States’ ability to “borrow . . . upon good terms”216 by assuming state
debts and restructuring interest payments to “bring the expenditure of the
nation to a level with its income,”217 all without resorting to high taxes that
might backfire by inducing smuggling.218
While acknowledging that “proper funding” of the national debt could
be a “national blessing,”219  Hamilton warned that debt was not an unquali-
fied good.  He counseled that “the creation of debt should always be accom-
panied with the means of extinguishment.”220  Hamilton’s mechanism for
committing to extinguish debt was a sinking fund, a basic concept which
Hamilton borrowed from eighteenth-century England.221  The sinking fund
reflected the “commitment of a borrower to amortize a portion of a debt
incurred prior to its maturity.”222  This commitment makes the debt “more
attractive to the lender” while also allowing the borrower to obtain a “lower
interest rate” (a benefit which applies whether the true goal of the sinking
fund is debt repayment or additional borrowing).223  As proposed by Hamil-
ton, the sinking fund would also repay debt through open market purchases
of U.S. securities.  These purchases would have the additional benefit of sta-
bilizing the value of securities that reflected the existing debt of the United
States.  The Commission’s open market purchases would protect U.S. credit
by stabilizing and “rais[ing] the value” of U.S. securities to par value.224
214 SYLLA & COWEN, supra note 206, at 69.
215 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2041 (1790).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 2063.
218 Id. at 1396, 2056 (noting that “increased . . . duties” would “promote smuggling”).
219 Id. at 2070.
220 Id. at 2070–71.  Hamilton’s critics charged that the sinking fund was not intended
to eliminate debt, but was rather a smokescreen designed to perpetuate debt by ensuring
good credit. See Sylla & Wilson, supra note 213, at 212; see also SMITH, supra note 13, at 868
(“A sinking fund, though instituted for the payment of old, facilitates very much the con-
tracting of new debts.”); cf. Sylla & Wilson supra note 213, at 213 (“[R]evenues pledged to
the sinking fund would likely generate surpluses over and above what was needed to retire
the debt in 30 years . . . .”).
221 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2045 (1790) (noting benefits of funded debt in Great Brit-
ain); see also FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 56–58 (1974)
(explaining how Hamilton borrowed ideas from Prime Minister Walpole’s sinking fund,
which was a mechanism used to “restore financial stability”); JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERAL-
IST ERA, 1789–1801, at 40 (1960) (“Hamilton’s model was the British financial
system . . . .”).
222 Sylla & Wilson, supra note 213, at 204.
223 Id.
224 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2045 (1790).
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Hamilton recommended that a five-member Commission administer the
United States’ sinking fund.  He proposed that the Commission consist of the
following principal officers of the United States: the Vice President of the
United States or President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Chief Justice, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney
General of the United States.225
Three or more of these officers could discharge public debt through
open market purchases of U.S. securities or by paying down the principal.226
The Commission would hold funds to make these purchases “in trust” and
fund initial purchases from the “nett product of the post-office” in a “sum not
exceeding one million of dollars.”227  Although the sinking fund proposal
preceded Hamilton’s plan for a Bank of the United States, he alluded to a
future proposal for such a bank and anticipated that the bank could help
facilitate sinking fund purchases in the future.228
Hamilton proposed a Commission independent of executive control.
He contemplated no direct presidential oversight for open market purchases
or principal repayments made with post office proceeds.  More importantly,
he recommended a five-member Commission rather than a single officer
(even himself as Secretary of the Treasury) who would be better suited to
carry out a unitary executive’s directives.229  Hamilton recommended that
Congress specify the five officers who constituted the Commission and bypass
the President’s nomination of principal officers to the Commission.  Three
of the five officers proposed by Hamilton possessed great independence
from the President.  Their primary offices were not subject to any form of
presidential control or removal, and two of these officers did not even attain
their primary offices through presidential appointments.
The original role of the Vice President illustrates the scope of Commis-
sioners’ structural independence.  The Vice President’s primary function was
to serve as President of the Senate and thus, part of both the executive and
the legislative branches.230  Before the Twelfth Amendment, the President
served alongside a Vice President who attained office by being runner-up in




228 Id. at 2072.
229 Id.; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 12, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating
that “[d]ecision” and “dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number”); Barkow, supra
note 20, at 37–38 (noting that the “unitary executive model of Article II” will mean “less
deliberation and debate” than a “multimember agency”).
230 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate . . . .”); Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice Presi-
dency, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 386–87 (2013) (stating that“[t]he Constitution’s original
meaning conceived of the Vice President . . . as occupying essentially a legislative position,”
though it “did not dissociate the Vice Presidency entirely from the executive branch”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 36  5-NOV-20 7:58
36 notre dame law review [vol. 96:1
the leading role in selecting their running mates.”231  The Constitution
afforded the Vice President a “Term of four Years,” which could be cut short
only by impeachment and was not subject to a presidential removal power.232
The Speaker of the House enjoyed similar independence from executive con-
trol.  The Speaker was part of the legislative branch, and the Constitution
authorized the House to both choose its Speaker233 and expel members of
the House by a two-thirds vote.234  Finally, the Chief Justice was part of the
judicial branch and enjoyed complete independence from executive control
after his appointment to office.  The Constitution allowed the Chief Justice to
serve for life without fear of executive removal, demotion, or reduction in
salary.235  Only the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General were
Commissioners who held executive offices appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, and who arguably served at the will of the
President.236
When considered in modern terms, Hamilton’s proposal offers a strik-
ing level of independence from executive control.  If the Commission he
contemplated in 1790 were assembled today, it would include Hillary Clinton
(who as runner-up in the 2016 presidential election would have been Vice
President under the original Constitution), Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi, Chief Justice John Roberts, Attorney General William Barr, and Trea-
sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.  By virtue of their offices, Clinton, Pelosi, and
Roberts would be free to make open market purchases without regard to
President Trump’s wishes.
Even when Hamilton contemplated a supervisory role for the President,
it was limited in scope.  This supervisory role involved borrowing funds to
supplement independent purchases funded through post-office returns.
Hamilton proposed that the Sinking Fund Commissioners “be authorized,
with the approbation of the President of the United States, to borrow . . . a sum not
exceeding twelve millions of dollars.”237  The President’s “approbation” was
231 Goldstein, supra note 230, at 397. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (after the
President, “the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the
Vice President”).
232 U.S. CONST. art. II (granting the Vice President the “same Term” as the President
and providing for his removal by impeachment).
233 The House has power to “chuse their Speaker and other Officers.” Id. art. I, § 2.
234 The United States Constitution Article 1, Section 5 allows the House to “punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.”
235 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour . . . .”).
236 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 6, at 651, 659 (arguing that these officers served at
will); cf. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that the “initial Treasury statute . . . appears
to make the Secretary of the Treasury responsible primarily to Congress rather than to the
President”); id. at 43 (arguing the Attorney General’s “initial position” was “hardly” an
“extension of the President”).
237 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2071 (1790) (emphasis added).
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essentially a veto power: the President had authority to approve or reject any
loans the Commissioners presented to him.
Hamilton’s earlier writings in The Federalist reveal his understanding that
“approbation” provides a limited power.  When discussing the Senate’s power
of “approbation” over the President’s nomination of a principal officer, for
example, Hamilton noted that the President retained a substantial first-
mover advantage in naming the nominee.  As described in The Federalist No.
76, the President’s “sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation
of the Senate, should fill an office” grants the President a “responsibility” as
“complete as if he were to make the final appointment.”238  The Senate’s
power to overrule the President’s nomination does not ensure that the “per-
son they might wish” or “a candidate in any degree more acceptable” will
later be brought forward.239  Likewise, if Commissioners had the initial
power to pursue certain types or amounts of loans in the first instance, they
would retain substantial control over the nature of federal borrowing submit-
ted for presidential approval.
Even if the Commissioners chose to pursue only those loans that the
President would likely approve,240 the President would have only an incom-
plete power over borrowing decisions.  This is because the President could
not force the Commissioners to take on loans that they were disinclined to
seek out in the first instance.  The President had no power to remove or
otherwise direct the actions of the Vice President and President of the Sen-
ate, Speaker of the House, and Chief Justice, at least one of whose votes were
necessary for the Commission to take action.  And in the context of borrow-
ing, a failure to act could have enormous ramifications for monetary policy.
It might require the United States to continue paying debt at a high interest
rate rather than obtaining a new loan with a lower interest rate.  Or the Com-
mission might refuse to borrow money to fund open market purchases
needed to stabilize the value of U.S. securities.  Failure to pursue open mar-
ket purchases would be similar to the Federal Reserve’s refusal to purchase
U.S. securities in a manner designed to lower interest rates today.241
Hamilton had good reason to propose an independent Sinking Fund
Commission in 1790.  By the time Hamilton proposed a sinking fund in the
United States, sinking funds had had a lengthy track record in England.  And
the English experience displayed widely known problems: sinking fund com-
mitments “were often honored in the breach and sometimes abused,”242 as
238 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 12, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton).
239 Id.
240 Hamilton referred to the possibility of a similar senatorial influence over nominees
as the “silent operation” of the power to grant advice and consent.  Id.  Over time, confir-
mation has granted the Senate only limited power over the President’s choice of nominee.
See Christine Kexel Chabot, A Long View of the Senate’s Influence over Supreme Court Appoint-
ments, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1229, 1262 fig.3 (2013).
241 The Federal Reserve does not need to take out loans or secure appropriations to
fund its purchases of U.S. securities. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 525 (“The Fed is also
remarkably independent of the appropriations process.”).
242 Sylla & Wilson, supra note 213, at 204.
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“fund accumulations were raided over and over for spending purposes other
than debt redemption.”243  The “flaw,” according to Dick Sylla and Jack Wil-
son, was “to leave Parliament and the king’s ministers in charge” of funds
accumulated for debt repayment.244  These political actors often shirked
their obligation to pay down debts when the funds could be diverted to other
uses.  The diverted funds often eliminated the need for an unpopular tax
increase and gained immediate favor with the politicians’ constituents.
These concerns with sinking funds were well documented by 1776, with the
publication of Adam Smith’s famous treatise, The Wealth of Nations.  As Smith
explained in The Wealth of Nations, the English often found it politically
“expedient” to pay for new expenses with money from the sinking fund, as
this resource allowed politicians to cover unforeseen expenses without
imposing a new tax.245  Adam Smith labeled the result “the usual misapplica-
tion of the sinking fund.”246
Alexander Hamilton’s writings echoed the concerns articulated by Adam
Smith.247  When Hamilton first proposed a sinking fund to the Continental
Congress in 1782, for example, he urged that it “be inviolably appropriated
to the payment of the principal of the said debt and shall on no account be
diverted to any other purpose.”248  And when Hamilton continued to pro-
pose a five-member Sinking Fund Commission in subsequent legislation in
1795, he again underscored its role in ensuring “inviolable application” of
funds to reduce debt.249  Hamilton’s proposal to appropriate the sinking
fund “permanently under the direction of Commissioners” was a key part of
his plan to “fix” the fund’s “destination unchangeably.”250  “[A] simple
appropriation of the sinking fund,” without an independent commission,
would not provide “a complete barrier against its being diverted when imme-
diate exigencies press.”251  Instead, appropriated funds would surely “tempt
the administrators of Government to lay hold of this resource, rather than
resort to new taxes.”252
By 1795, an independent Commission alone did not guarantee a suffi-
cient safeguard for Hamilton—he also recommended that the application of
243 Id. at 205.
244 Id.
245 SMITH, supra note 13, at 873; Sylla & Wilson, supra note 213, at 205.
246 SMITH, supra note 13, at 873.
247 See Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders,
1776–1790, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 879, 901 (2002).
248 Continental Congress Report on a Letter from the Speaker of the Rhode Island Assembly, 16
December 1782, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https://foun-
ders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0123 (last visited Aug. 9, 2020).
249 See Report on a Plan for the Further Support of Public Credit, [16 January 1795], NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https://founders.archives.gov/docu-
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funds become “part of the Contract with the Creditors” and therefore clothed
“with the character of private property.”253  It was “safe to put the fund so
intirely out of the command of the Government” with these contractual com-
mitments, Hamilton reasoned, because amounts pledged to the sinking fund
would not “tie[ ] up” “too great a proportion of the public revenue.”254
Based on his knowledge of past experience in England, Hamilton had good
reason to fear a sinking fund placed at the sole disposal of a responsive politi-
cal actor (be it Parliament or a unitary executive).  Instead, Congress could
count on its sinking fund directives to be executed more faithfully when
administered by an independent Commission and checked by contractual
obligations.
B. The Sinking Fund Act of August 12, 1790
The First Congress passed “An Act making Provision for the Reduction
of the Public Debt” on August 12, 1790.255  The Act authorized open market
purchases of U.S. securities that would both “effect a reduction of the
amount of the public debt” and benefit the “creditors of the United States, by
raising the price of their stock.”256  Congress further directed that all
purchases be made in a “manner” and with “regulations . . . best calculated to
fulfill the intent of this act.”257  The Act funded open market purchases
through surplus revenue from certain duties and loans,258 and it circum-
scribed purchase power and limited creditors’ potential profits by capping
purchases at “market price, if not exceeding the par or true value” of U.S.
securities.259
Within this framework, Congress delegated general power over purchas-
ing decisions to a multimember Sinking Fund Commission comprised of five
named officers.  The Act provided that “the purchases to be made of the said
debt, shall be made under the direction of the President of the Senate, the
Chief Justice, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Attorney General.”260  The Act assigned the President a limited role in
purchases when it allowed him the “approbation” of purchases already
agreed upon by three or more members of the Commission.261  It specified
that the Commissioners, “or any three of whom, with the approbation of the
President of the United States, shall cause the said purchases to be made in
253 Id. (emphasis in original).
254 Id.
255 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186.
256 Id.
257 Id. § 2.
258 Id. §§ 1, 4.
259 Id. § 1.
260 Id. § 2.
261 Id.
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such manner, and under such regulations as shall appear to them best calcu-
lated to fulfill the intent of this act.”262
The structure adopted by Congress modified Hamilton’s proposal.  In
one change, Congress substituted the Secretary of State for the Speaker of
the House,263 a move which a commentator has subsequently explained as
necessary to avoid violating Article I, Section 6’s prohibition on members of
Congress holding executive offices.264  While Congress’s substitution of the
Secretary of State for the Speaker of the House also meant that three officers
on the Commission were subject to removal at will by the President, Congress
did not act as though this change would afford the President complete con-
trol over all of the Commission’s decisions.  Instead, it added an additional
control mechanism: approbation.  In cases where a majority of the Commis-
sion agreed to a purchase, approbation subjected these open market
purchase decisions to the President’s approval.265  An approbation power
seems to indicate Congress’s choice to grant the President additional power
he did not automatically possess under the Constitution, as the approbation
power did not appear in other statutes that established Departments in which
the President’s removal power was thought to control single officers, such as
the Secretary of the Treasury or Foreign Affairs.266
The President’s approbation power was limited, moreover, because it
checked only a subset of the Commission’s substantive decisions: those cases
in which the Commission desired a purchase that the President did not.  In
all other cases, the Commission checked the President and had power to
block purchases.  In particular, the Act stated that
purchases . . . shall be made under the direction of the President of the
Senate, the Chief Justice, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, and the Attorney General for the time being; and who, or any three of
whom, with the approbation of the President of the United States, shall
cause the said purchases to be made.267
No purchase could take place where the President believed that an open
market purchase would serve statutory goals, but a majority of the Commis-
sion disagreed.  The Commission’s checking function addressed one of Ham-
262 Id. § 2.  A separate section of the Act authorized the President sole power to borrow
up to two million dollars for open market purchases.  See id. § 4.
263 See id. § 2.
264 See Bamzai, supra note 6, at 1339 (observing that “[t]he substitution suggested that
Congress was concerned about” structure and the fact that Article I, Section 6 “barred
members of Congress from serving in the executive branch”).
265 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, § 2.  Congress funded initial purchases through surplus from
duties imposed on imported “goods, wares, and merchandise.” Id. § 1.  The sinking fund
was also supported by surplus from duties imposed on the “tonnage of ships or vessels.” Id.
Congress also vested power to borrow funds for additional purchases in the President
alone.  Id. § 4.
266 See, e.g., An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (1789); An
Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to Be Denominated the Department of For-
eign Affairs, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28 (1789).
267 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, § 2.
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ilton’s key concerns with sinking funds—the need to limit purchasing power
so that funds would not be misused for political reasons.268
The Commission’s multimember structure was also especially important.
Its five inaugural members were primed to check one another, and Hamil-
ton, Secretary of the Treasury, and Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, were
known political rivals.  Further, the President of the Senate and Chief Justice
attained membership on the Commission through offices that were not sub-
ject to presidential removal power.  Because the Commission required at
least three votes to approve a purchase, if Hamilton and Jefferson could not
agree on a purchase, the vote of the completely independent President of the
Senate and Chief Justice would be determinative. (As noted below, John Jay’s
missing vote prevented the Commission from acting immediately during a
crucial episode in the financial crisis of 1792.)  The Commission or any three
of its members had the sole power to initiate purchases and were required to
approve the timing and amount of open market purchases before they could
be approved by the President.
Records of congressional debates on Hamilton’s proposed legislation
devote little attention to the sinking fund and do not address the constitu-
tionality of its structure.269  Most of the debates focused on the momentous
controversy over the assumption of state debts270—a controversy which was
famously resolved in the “Room Where It Happens”271 (a “behind-the-
scenes” deal brokered by Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison).272  Legislators’
scattered references to the Sinking Fund Commission allude to the “perma-
nency and value” that the fund would lend to the United States’ pledge to
repay its debts.273  They also praised the sinking fund’s ability to be “con-
stantly operating” with purchases designed to stabilize the value of U.S.
securities.274
Hamilton expressed no constitutional doubts about the sinking fund’s
independent structure in his proposal.  While it is possible that the subset of
remaining historical records fails to capture fully the congressional debate
268 See supra notes 248–49.
269 The Annals of Congress and leading accounts do not note any debates about the
constitutionality of the Sinking Fund Commission. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 9, at 73–78;
MCDONALD, supra note 221, at 47–65; Miller, supra note 221, at 33–54.
270 MCDONALD, supra note 221, at 53 (noting “conflicting . . . interests” of states with
large debts and states who “had retired the better part of their debts”).
271 See LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON 126–29 (2015) (highlighting the song entitled,
“The Room Where It Happens”).
272 MLLER, supra note 221, at 48.  In “exchange” for the capital’s “permanent removal
to the Potomac, Jefferson and Madison pledged themselves to change the votes of several
southern congressmen in favor of the funding-assumption plan.” Id.
273 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1477 (1790); id. at 1398 (noting that the “sinking fund” helps
ensure that the United States will undertake “every exertion . . . to discharge the debt”); cf.
id. at 1405 (questioning whether the Sinking Fund’s use of postal revenue would be suffi-
cient to discharge national debt).
274 Id. at 1478; id. at 1492 (noting an “ample sinking fund” will help “give as certain a
value as possible” to U.S. securities).
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over the sinking fund’s structure,275 Congress seems unlikely to have glossed
over a known constitutional concern.  As illustrated by the vigorous debate
over removal provisions for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,276 the First Con-
gress was carefully attuned to structural constitutional concerns related to the
President’s ability to control executive officers.  The credit and debt propos-
als raised a few distinct structural debates, such as whether Article I, Section 8
allowed Congress’s enumerated borrowing power to be delegated to Hamil-
ton as Treasury Secretary rather than the President.277  These isolated refer-
ences to structural constitutional concerns reflect no qualms about the
independent structure of the Sinking Fund Commission.
An independent Commission was not merely enacted into law, but it was
proposed by Alexander Hamilton, a Framer of the Constitution, as well as the
first Secretary of the Treasury.  It was then passed into law by the First Con-
gress, with opportunity for votes and input from many members who “had
helped to compose or to ratify the Constitution itself,”278 and signed into law
by President George Washington.  One would expect all of these actors to
have a clear grasp of the original public meaning of the Constitution, as well
as a strong commitment to honor the structural commitments established
therein.  Their decision to form an independent Sinking Fund Commission
belies the notion that this structure violated the newly minted Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson’s vehement dislike for the sinking fund and Hamil-
ton’s financial proposals279 provided strong incentives for him to raise a con-
stitutional objection.  Instead, Jefferson took his seat on the Commission
without any recorded objection to its structure.  He sat with Adams, Jay, and
two Framers of the Constitution, Edmund Randolph and Alexander Hamil-
ton.  All five of these officers—who no doubt had an exceptional understand-
ing of the original public meaning of the Constitution—proceeded to serve
on the Commission without recording any objection that its independent
structure violated the Constitution.  Further, when assuming their primary
offices, all of these persons took an oath swearing “to support this Constitu-
275 While the Annals of Congress are the best available records of early congressional
debates, they were “not published contemporaneously” and were assembled decades later
“using the best records available, primarily newspaper accounts.”  Baude & Campbell,
supra note 207 (manuscript at 10) (quoting Annals of Congress, LIBR. CONG., http://mem-
ory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2020)).  It is therefore possi-
ble that Congress debated the constitutionality of the Sinking Fund Commission but the
Annals omitted this debate.
276 Congress debated whether the Constitution permitted removal of the Secretary by
impeachment alone, by the President with consent of the Senate, or by the President
alone. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
277 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 73 n.143 (observing that Madison “objected that Congress
should not sidestep the President by giving authority to his agent,” while Smith argued that
borrowing power could not be delegated to the President at all).
278 Id. at 4.
279 Richard Sylla, Robert E. Wright & David J. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton, Central
Banker: Crisis Management During the U.S. Financial Panic of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61, 79
(2009).
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tion.”280  Presumably their oaths would not allow them to sit on a Commis-
sion that violated fundamental structural requirements of the Constitution.
When one groups these Commissioners with the First Congress and Pres-
ident George Washington, who passed and signed the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion legislation into law, one would be hard-pressed to think of any other
group with a superior understanding of the Constitution’s original public
meaning.  Their decisions to establish and operate the Sinking Fund Com-
mission provide overwhelming evidence that the Commission’s independent
structure was permitted by the Constitution.  The Constitution allowed Con-
gress to delegate executive power to a multimember body with substantial
independence from the President.
C. The Sinking Fund Commission’s Independent Decisions
to Purchase Public Debt
The Sinking Fund Commission’s purchase decisions further illustrate its
independence from executive control.  The Commissioners of the Sinking
Fund began purchasing U.S. debt right away.  On August 27, 1790, John
Adams, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton met in New
York City.281  These four members of the Commission agreed to apply sums
“not exceeding fifty thousand Dollars per month . . . towards the purchase of
the present Domestic Debt of the United [S]tates.”282  President George
Washington approved the purchases the following day.283  At the end of the
year, the Commission reported details of the places, times, and prices of
approved purchases to Congress.284
Market fluctuations soon prompted the Commission to expand open
market purchases in a manner designed to stabilize the value of U.S. securi-
ties.  On August 15, 1791, the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury,
and Attorney General approved additional purchases in a sum of up to
$400,000.285  In early 1792, a steep market crash and financial panic cried
280 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
281 See Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [27 August 1790], NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Hamilton/01-06-02-0475 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020) (showing that Attorney General
Edmund Randolph was not present).
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 See Report of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, 21 December 1790, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (John Adams), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/
01-07-02-0251 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
285 See Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [15 August 1791], NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (Thomas Jefferson), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamil-
ton/01-09-02-0045 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020); see also From Alexander Hamilton to William
Seton, [15 August 1791], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https:/
/founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-09-02-0046 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020)
(authorizing purchases with a sum of up to $150,000).
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out for immediate action by the Commission.286  On March 20, 1792, Alexan-
der Hamilton notified John Adams and Thomas Jefferson that the Treasurer
had just gone in the market to purchase additional government securities,
with funds the Commission had approved earlier.287  These purchases were
designed “to maintain or restore the price of Government securities in the
face of the panic,”288 and while they had some beneficial effect in the mar-
ket, they were not enough.289  Alexander Hamilton urged additional mea-
sures designed to inject liquidity into a market from which investors were
rapidly withdrawing funds.  In addition to relaying favorable news about a
loan from the Dutch290 and encouraging private banks to lend money at
high rates,291 Hamilton advised the Commission to approve further
purchases of U.S. securities without delay.
Four Commissioners—Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, and Randolph—met
in Philadelphia to consider more purchases.292  They were split equally on
purchases proposed by Hamilton and could not agree whether the Act
authorized purchases of devalued public securities at a certain fraction of par
value.293  The fifth Commissioner, Chief Justice John Jay, could not cast a
deciding vote, because he was out of town and sitting on the Circuit Court in
New York City.294  John Adams sent a letter imploring Jay to return to Phila-
delphia “as speedily as possible” to resolve the matter.295
286 Traditional accounts link the “bubble and crash of spring 1792” to heavily leveraged
investments of New York speculator William Duer.  Sylla et al., supra note 279, at 73.
287 See From Alexander Hamilton to John Adams, [20 March 1792], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUN-
DERS ONLINE [hereinafter Hamilton, To John Adams] (Alexander Hamilton), https://foun-
ders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0124 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020); To
Thomas Jefferson from Alexander Hamilton, 20 March 179[2], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE [hereinafter Hamilton, To Thomas Jefferson] (Alexander Hamilton), https://foun-
ders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-23-02-0263 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).  Hamil-
ton reminded Adams and Jefferson that the amounts spent were part of the sum
preapproved for purchases on August 15, 1791. See Hamilton, To John Adams, supra; Ham-
ilton, To Thomas Jefferson, supra.
288 Hamilton, To John Adams, supra note 287, at n.1.
289 See To Alexander Hamilton from William Seton, [21 March 1792], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUN-
DERS ONLINE (William Seton), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-
11-02-0131 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020) (“Stocks rose a little yesterday in consequence . . . of
the Treasurer having entered the Market at Phila.—but today they are down again.”).
290 Sylla et al., supra note 279, at 83 (noting that Hamilton “employed news of the
Dutch loan to the United States to reassure the markets of the strength of the govern-
ment’s finances”).
291 See id.
292 See John Adams to John Jay, 21 March 1792, at n.2 NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE
(John Adams), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0126 (last
visited Aug. 11, 2020).
293 See id. (describing different views on interpretation of purchase restrictions in the
Act); Sylla et al., supra note 279, at 78 (noting that Adams and Hamilton favored immedi-
ate action while Jefferson and Randolph wanted to wait for Jay’s vote).
294 John Adams to John Jay 21 March 1792, supra note 292, at n.1.
295 Id.
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Jay declined this request a few days later.  Jay opined that his judicial
duties presented a “primary” obligation to which his duty to attend the Sink-
ing Fund Commission was “secondary.”296  As the Commissioners’ dispute
involved a mere “law Question,” however, Jay offered to draft an opinion on
this matter and send it to the Commission “Express.”297  Despite doubts that
Jay’s written opinion would resolve the impasse,298 the need to “operate
immediately, if at all,” as well as the legal nature of the dispute, prompted
Hamilton, Adams, and Randolph to accept Jay’s written opinion in the hope
that it would resolve the dispute.299  They did so over Jefferson’s dissent.300
Jay finally provided his opinion on March 31, 1792.301  He concluded
that the Act allowed the proposed purchases of public debt.  He opined that
the Act’s restrictions operated solely to exclude purchases in which the mar-
ket price exceeded “the sum actually due from” the United States “in dis-
charge” of its debts.302  Hamilton predicted that Chief Justice Jay’s opinion
would “enable” him to “enter the Market more advantageously for the sup-
port of the Debt,”303 and on April 4, four Commissioners met to vote on
these purchases.  After Chief Justice Jay provided his opinion, Edmund Ran-
dolph cast the deciding and necessary third vote and joined Adams and Ham-
ilton in approving up to $100,000 in additional purchases.304
Jefferson publicly dissented from these purchases on the ground that
the purchase prices would exceed the instruments’ true value in a rapidly
296 To Alexander Hamilton from John Jay, 23 March 1792, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-
11-02-0141 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
297 Id.
298 To Alexander Hamilton from Philip Livingston, 24 March 1792, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUN-
DERS ONLINE (Philip Livingston), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/
01-11-02-0144 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
299 Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [26 March 1792], NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0155
(last visited Aug. 11, 2020).  The Commission approved a limited set of purchases while
they awaited Jay’s input on the legality of further purchases.  Id.
300 See id.
301 See John Jay to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [31 March 1792], NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (John Jay), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-
02-0175 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
302 Id. (analyzing purchase restrictions created by statutory words “if not exceeding the
par or true value thereof”) (emphasis omitted).
303 Alexander Hamilton to Philip Livingston, 2 April 1792, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-
11-02-0182 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
304 See Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, 4 April 1792, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0187
(last visited Aug. 11, 2020).  The Commission also approved a further amount up to
$200,000 in purchases on April 12. Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [12 April
1792], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Hamilton/01-11-02-0225 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
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collapsing market.305  Jefferson appeared to have regarded inflated purchase
prices as an unfair windfall to speculators.306  Jefferson’s dissents and
attempts to delay purchases may also have been calculated “to injure Hamil-
ton and the political party and financial revolution he led.”307  Whatever Jef-
ferson’s ultimate motivation, his lone dissent did not stop Hamilton from
promptly seeking the President’s approval for purchases authorized by three
members of the Commission.308  By April 16, the Commission’s agent, Wil-
liam Seton, reported numerous beneficial purchases, offering hope that the
“public mind” could soon calm and return the U.S. debt to its “proper and
real value.”309  Interestingly, Hamilton viewed Seton’s execution of purchases
through a constitutional lens.  He discussed payment for Seton’s work as a
temporary purchasing agent and noted that this ad hoc arrangement
reflected Hamilton’s decision to “forbear[ ] to employ some officer of the
United States” to execute purchases instead.310  By April of 1792, Hamilton
understood that the “worst had passed” and that these purchases had their
intended effect of stabilizing the market for U.S. securities.311
This episode illustrates the President’s limited control over the Commis-
sion’s purchase decisions.  Even though President Washington approved
purchases in response to the 1792 market crash, the Commission initially
lacked the majority of votes required to initiate a purchase.312  Only after
John Jay weighed in did Edmond Randolph authorize the purchases urged
by Alexander Hamilton and John Adams and leave Thomas Jefferson as the
lone dissenter.313  Because the Act vested decisions of whether or not to initi-
ate purchases in the Commission, a majority of the Commission checked the
President and had to sign off before any purchases could be presented to the
President for approbation.
The Commission’s independent structure prevented it from acting as
quickly as it could have to address a financial panic.  A single officer directed
by the President could have intervened far more quickly.  Instead, the Sink-
ing Fund Commissioners had trouble even meeting to vote on open market
305 See Dissenting Opinion on the Sinking Fund, [12 April 1792?], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUN-
DERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-27-02-0786 (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2020).
306 See id.
307 Sylla et al., supra note 279, at 79.
308 See From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [12 April 1792], NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE (Alexander Hamilton), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Hamilton/01-11-02-0228 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
309 To Alexander Hamilton from William Seton, 16 April 1792, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (William Seton), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-
0234 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
310 From Alexander Hamilton to William Seton, [15 August 1791], supra note 285.  Hamil-
ton’s distinction between gig work and more permanent government duties fulfilled by
officers tracks the distinction noted by Jennifer Mascott. See Mascott, supra note 3, at 534.
311 Sylla, Wright & Cowen, supra note 279, at 83.
312 See supra discussion surrounding notes 293–95.
313 See supra discussion surrounding notes 304–06.
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purchases, and John Jay exercised substantial independence by refusing to
attend a Commission meeting that interfered with his judicial duties.  One
might assume that actions such as Jay’s may have amounted to a “neglect of
duty” and established cause for his removal.314  But there are no records
showing that President Washington was asked to intervene and direct Jay to
attend the critical Commission meeting or otherwise resolve the Commis-
sioners’ internal dispute.  And Washington had no power to remove Jay from
his judicial office.
The Commission’s substantive policy decisions also reflected indepen-
dent votes and opinions rather than a single policy commanded by President
Washington.  As noted above, Commissioners Hamilton and Jefferson cast
publicly opposing votes and openly disagreed about whether to initiate open
market purchases during the 1792 crisis.  President Washington’s apparent
power to superintend and remove them did not trump the Commission’s
multimember structure, result in a unified vote by these executive officers, or
lead to either Hamilton’s or Jefferson’s removal from the Commission.  Ham-
ilton’s and Jefferson’s disagreement divided the Commission and initially
prevented it from forming the three-member majority needed to approve
purchases during Chief Justice Jay’s absence.  Only after the Chief Justice
provided a written opinion to the Commission did Randolph join Hamilton
and Adams in approving the purchases over Jefferson’s dissent.  The
purchases approved during the 1792 crisis bear the hallmarks of indepen-
dent decisionmaking by the Sinking Fund Commission.
Despite this high level of independence, the Commission was still able to
act in time to stabilize the market for U.S. securities.  And its fundamental
independence still seemed necessary to guard against a political temptation
to raid sinking fund reserves for purposes other than repaying debt.  It is no
surprise that Hamilton continued to propose, and Congress continued to
enact, legislation facilitating open market purchases and repayment of debt
through the same independent, five-member Commission first adopted in
1790.315
IV. THE SINKING FUND COMMISSION PROVIDES A DIRECT FOUNDING-ERA
PRECEDENT FOR THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE
The Sinking Fund Commission provides a compelling originalist prece-
dent for the independence of the Open Market Committee.  Both the Sink-
ing Fund Commission and Open Market Committee have carried out open
market purchases in furtherance of statutorily defined goals and execute
314 Jane Manners & Lev Menand, Presidential Removal: Defining Inefficiency, Neglect of
Duty, and Malfeasance in Office, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 43) (not-
ing in the eighteenth century, “ ‘neglect of duty’ meant failing to perform one’s duties in a
way that caused specific harm to the entity . . . to which the duties were owed”).
315 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 38, §§ 6–7, 1 Stat. 281, 282–83 (making supplementary provi-
sions regarding the debt of the United States); Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 45, §§ 9–12, 1 Stat.
433, 435–37 (providing for public credit and the redemption of the public debt); Sylla &
Wilson, supra note 213, at 211 (noting 1795 legislation).
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enumerated sovereign powers.316  Congress designed both agencies to pos-
sess substantial independence from the President and granted both the Sink-
ing Fund Commission and the Open Market Committee responsibility for
initiating open market purchases.  President Washington had no power to
initiate open market purchases unless a majority of the Sinking Fund Com-
mission agreed to do so, just as the President today has no power to initiate
an open market purchase unless a majority of the Open Market Committee
agrees to do so.317  As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist, this type
of structure departs from a unitary executive model by subjecting the Presi-
dent’s power “in part to the control and cooperation of others.”318  Such
limitations on the President’s power conflict with unitary executivist argu-
ments that officers cannot “refuse[ ]” the President’s order “to take an action
within the officer’s statutory authority.”319  They also undermine Hamilton’s
conception of an “energetic” executive characterized by “[d]ecision, activity,
. . . and dispatch.”320
For both the Sinking Fund Commission and Open Market Committee,
Congress chose not to vest purchasing decisions in the Secretary of the Trea-
sury or another single officer situated to implement a unified executive pol-
icy.  Instead, Congress chose multimember bodies whose members were
primed to cast opposing votes and express diverse opinions on open market
purchases.321  It is difficult to think of a reason why Congress would ever
replace a single officer with a multimember committee if its goal were to
implement a singular executive directive.  Dissents issued by members of
both the Sinking Fund Commission and Open Market Committee reveal that
the multimember design served a different purpose.  This structure allowed
members of the Commission and Committee to check the President and one
another rather than carrying out a single directive at the behest of the Presi-
dent.  And for the Sinking Fund Commission, the independence created by a
multimember structure trumped any unified control the President may have
possessed over the Secretaries of State and Treasury and Attorney General.
Congress further sheltered the Sinking Fund Commission and Open
Market Committee from presidential control through appointment and ten-
ure provisions.  With respect to the Sinking Fund Commission, the President
had no power to appoint Commissioners who served by virtue of their
existing offices.  While three of the Commissioners (Secretary of the Trea-
sury, Secretary of State, and Attorney General) had already been appointed
as principal executive officers, the Vice President was never appointed by the
President and was instead elected as runner-up in the presidential elec-
tion.322  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed to a judicial
316 See supra note 188.
317 See supra discussion surrounding notes 261–63.
318 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 12, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton).
319 Miller, supra note 2, at 44.
320 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 12, at 423–24 (Alexander Hamilton).
321 See discussion supra notes 57, 292–304.
322 See supra note 231.
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office and never received a separate appointment to an executive office.  The
President had no power to appoint replacements for or remove the Chief
Justice or Vice President from office, even though their attendance at meet-
ings and votes were sometimes needed to initiate open market purchases.323
The Act left the President no recourse over the Chief Justice and Vice Presi-
dent if these officers neglected their duties and refused to show up for the
Commission’s meetings, as was the case with John Jay in 1792.
Many aspects of the Sinking Fund Commission’s ex officio appointments
and related tenure provisions afforded substantially more independence
than tenure and appointments provisions for the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee.324  Whereas the First Congress gave the President no say in
appointing ex officio Sinking Fund Commissioners,325 the President cur-
rently has the power to appoint Governors (who then become ex officio
members of the Open Market Committee) once every fourteen years.  And
while the President could not remove at least two members of the Sinking
Fund Commission,326 even in cases of malfeasance or neglect of office, the
President has some level of removal power over all members of the Open
Market Committee.  The President may remove the Governors who comprise
a majority of the Committee “for cause.”327  In turn, these Governors have
the power to remove Federal Reserve bank presidents (who constitute a
minority of the Committee) at will328—an arrangement that provides ade-
quate “[p]residential oversight” and ostensibly affords the President the same
level of control as he has over the Governors.329  This for-cause removal
power would allow the President to force the Committee members to tend to
official duties if they, like John Jay, were tempted to neglect important duties,
such as the need to attend and vote at meetings held to transact Committee
business.
The historical record also makes clear that the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion falls outside of a unitary executive framework.  The Sinking Fund Com-
mission’s multimember structure plainly trumped the unified control that
some claim the President possessed over Commissioners whom the President
could remove from their primary offices at will.330  The Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General failed to carry out a singular
executive policy when deciding whether or not to proceed with crucial open
market purchases.  Instead, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton
and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson cast different votes, Jefferson
323 See supra notes 232, 235.
324 MASHAW, supra note 6, at 43 (noting that the lack of power to appoint Sinking Fund
Commissioners created an “‘independent commission[ ]’ in an even stronger sense than
those we recognize today”).
325 See PRAKASH, supra note 6, at 279.
326 See supra discussion surrounding notes 230–31, 234–36.
327 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2018).
328 Id. § 248(f).
329 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010).
330 But see CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 53 (noting removal power afforded execu-
tive control over the Sinking Fund Commission); Bamzai, supra note 6, at 1339.
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penned public dissents, and Attorney General Edmund Randolph withheld
his vote until after the Chief Justice was able to provide a legal opinion.331
The lack of a unified executive policy was also anticipated by Congress, as
Congress added an additional requirement of presidential approbation of
purchases approved by the Commission.  If the President’s ability to remove
these officers at will gave him complete control over the Commission’s
purchasing decisions, there would be no need for the President to approve
purchases agreed to by these Commissioners.
Nor did an approbation power somehow allow the President to direct all
of the Commission’s purchasing decisions.332  As noted above, approbation
applied to only a limited subset of the Commission’s decisions and provided
no presidential role in cases where three or more members of the Commis-
sion opposed a purchase.  The Sinking Fund Commission’s ability to block
purchases reflected an important power and checked the President’s ability
to execute the law.  It is the same check that the Open Market Committee
exercises, and that President Trump finds so vexing, today.  The President
may ask the Committee to make open market purchases or take other action
to reduce interest rates to bolster the economy, but he has no power to bring
about the desired purchases or rate reductions unless a majority of the Open
Market Committee agrees to take such action.
The history of the Sinking Fund Commission provides an important
qualification on the Decision of 1789.  It reveals that the Founders never rec-
ognized a one-size-fits-all model of executive power under the Constitution.
The structure ultimately adopted by the First Congress gave the Commission
substantial independence.  It cannot be squared with the unitary executivist
argument that Article II requires the President to possess “all” power over
open market purchases.333  The structure passed into law afforded the Presi-
dent control over only some of the Sinking Fund Commission’s decisions,
and thus provides evidence that the Constitution allows Congress to limit the
President’s role in executing certain laws.
If anything, the level of independence that the First Congress chose for
the Sinking Fund was modest in comparison to other alternatives considered
at the time.  According to his proposal, Alexander Hamilton would have
staffed the Commission with a majority of independent officers who could be
removed only by Congress, and he would have given the President no power
to approve or reject their purchase decisions.334  Under Hamilton’s propo-
sal, it is doubtful the President could have forced a majority of the Commis-
sion to assemble and tend to its job of deciding whether to make an open
market purchase, if a majority of the nonexecutive officers acted like John Jay
and decided to put Commission work on the back burner.
The level of independence proposed by Hamilton may seem extreme in
modern terms, but it reflects the more restrictive views of presidential
331 See supra notes 292–308.
332 Contra PRAKASH, supra note 6, at 279–80; Bamzai, supra note 6, at 1339–40.
333 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334 See supra notes 225–29.
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removal power considered in debates leading up to the Decision of 1789.  In
particular, Hamilton’s openness to a commission controlled by a majority of
nonremovable officers would be roughly equivalent to an executive officer
who could be removed only by impeachment.335  With respect to the Sinking
Fund Commission, Congress’s alterations of Hamilton’s proposal struck a
balance in favor of a more (but not all-) powerful executive.  Congress lim-
ited the Commissioners whom the President could not remove to the Chief
Justice and President of the Senate/Vice President, and also allowed the Pres-
ident to approve purchases agreed to by the Commission.  This structure
retained the Commission’s power to check purchases desired by the Presi-
dent, but it did not place the Commission’s work entirely beyond the Presi-
dent’s control.  In this sense, the Commission’s level of independence is
entirely in line with the level of independence that the Open Market Com-
mittee possesses today.  When taken together, the modest independence
approved by Congress and the extreme independence suggested by Hamil-
ton establish important limitations on the unitary executive theory and argu-
ments that the President must have the power to remove all officers carrying
out executive functions at will.  The Sinking Fund Commission should also
give pause to any judges who may feel emboldened to jettison existing legisla-
tion or precedent based on unitary executivist arguments.336
The Sinking Fund Commission also provides a helpful precedent for a
relaxed application of Appointments Clause requirements.  Here, of course,
the First Congress’s decision to bestow ex officio positions upon five princi-
pal officers is distinct from appointments concerns raised by the Open Mar-
ket Committee.  As explained above, the primary Appointments Clause
concerns for the Open Market Committee focus on the Federal Reserve bank
presidents who cast Committee votes without being appointed as principal
officers.
On closer scrutiny, however, the Sinking Fund Commission’s ex officio
provisions raise questions about whether all members of multimember agen-
cies are subject to Appointments Clause requirements for executive officers.
In addressing requirements for ex officio placement in a second office,
courts have generally allowed Congress to bypass a second appointments pro-
cess when the ex officio provision merely expands duties germane to an
existing office.  As recounted by Aditya Bamzai, a member of Congress
offered a similar explanation in an 1806 debate on the constitutionality of
dual officeholding.337  The Supreme Court has held that the use of an ex
officio post to expand statutorily required duties does not require a second
335 Hamilton proposed a Commission in which the Chief Justice and Vice President
could be removed only through impeachment, and the Speaker of the House could be
expelled only by the House. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
336 See Christine Chabot, Alexander Hamilton’s Independent Agency,  A.B.A. ADMIN. &.
REGUL. L. NEWS, Winter 2020, at 12 (discussing the Sinking Fund Commission as precedent
supporting the independent structures of the Federal Trade Commission and Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau).
337 Bamzai, supra note 6, at 1339.
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appointment or run afoul of the rule that Congress cannot “appoint the
officer.”338  With respect to the Commission, Congress’s decision to make the
Secretaries of the Treasury and State and the Attorney General ex officio
Commissioners may have been a permissible expansion of duties germane to
existing executive offices.  But the Chief Justice was a different matter.
The Chief Justice was first appointed to an Article III office outside of the
executive branch and performed judicial duties that had nothing to do with
paying the debt through open market purchases of U.S. securities.  The new
duties Congress assigned as Sinking Fund Commissioner were not germane
to the Chief Justice’s judicial duties, as they were duties related to an office in
the executive branch.  It would seem that the Chief Justice served on the
Commission without any appointment qualifying him to be an executive
officer.  The probable explanation is that he did not need to be appointed as
an executive “Officer of the United States” in order to serve on the
Commission.
The historical record supports a limited appointments process in situa-
tions where persons without appointments as principal officers share primary
decision-making responsibility with other properly appointed principal
officers.  As regards the Federal Reserve bank presidents, the failure to
appoint the Chief Justice as an executive officer therefore provides helpful
precedent.  Like the Chief Justice, the bank presidents share primary deci-
sion-making responsibility for Open Market Committee decisions with the
Governors, who are properly appointed principal officers.  Neither the Chief
Justice nor the bank presidents can exercise significant authority of the
United States and make purchasing decisions on their own.  Appointments
Clause requirements that were excused for some members of the Sinking
Fund Commission should also be excused for similarly situated presidents of
Federal Reserve banks.
CONCLUSION
Leading originalist accounts of executive power draw on the “Constitu-
tion’s elegant simplicity,”339 and an understanding so straightforward that it
“resonates strongly with the very earliest lessons we learn about our constitu-
tional system” in primary and secondary school.340  As gracefully explained
by Justice Scalia, granting the President anything less than complete control
over “all” of the executive power would violate Article II.341  This understand-
338 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994) (noting that a second appointment
is not required where the role “of military judge is ‘germane’ to that of military officer”);
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300–01 (1893) (noting that a second appoint-
ment is not required where Congress devolved upon properly appointed officers “addi-
tional duties, germane to the offices already held”).
339 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 6, at 664.
340 Id. at 544.
341 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ing “forecloses historical arguments” for independent agencies.342  It admits
of “no caveats” and “no exceptions.”343
Elegant though it may be, the unitary executive explanation does not
hold up to granular analysis of empirical evidence reflecting original mean-
ing and practice.  Historical records reveal that the problems facing the
Founding generation and the solutions adopted by the First Congress were
not so simple.  Given the complex panoply of concerns present at the Found-
ing of our Republic, it should come as no surprise that Alexander Hamilton
advocated a variety of approaches to executive power.  Sometimes he argued
in favor of an all-powerful executive.344  But sometimes he did not.345
Hamilton’s proposal for the Sinking Fund Commission provides a clear
example of an instance in which he called for independent decisionmaking
and limits on the President’s control over the execution of federal stat-
utes.346  Hamilton was not alone in endorsing an independent body.  His
proposal for an independent, multimember Commission was also passed and
signed into law by members of the First Congress and President George
Washington.347  And the Sinking Fund Commission was ultimately run by
Hamilton alongside John Adams, John Jay, Edmund Randolph, and Thomas
Jefferson.348  Taken together, these actions belie any argument that Con-
gress’s delegation of open market purchases to an independent, multimem-
ber commission violates the Constitution.
As Alexander Hamilton’s writings show, he proposed an independent
Sinking Fund Commission in order to guarantee an “inviolable” commitment
to disperse funds according to a statutory mandate.349  Without such inde-
pendence, political actors such as the President could not resist the tempta-
tion to violate Congress’s statutory mandate and divert funds to more
politically expedient uses.  Today’s Open Market Committee enjoys a similar
rationale for its independence from executive control.  The Committee’s
dual mandate will sometimes require it to take actions which are “politically
unpopular . . . in the short term,”350 and to ignore the President’s demand to
lower interest rates in an effort to heat up the economy before an election.351
The Sinking Fund Commission provides a direct original precedent for
Congress’s decision to shelter the Open Market Committee from immediate
political influence.  Critics can no longer dismiss the Committee’s indepen-
342 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 6, at 663.
343 Id. at 664.
344 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 54–55 (discussing Hamilton’s 1793 Pacificus
letters).
345 See supra notes 139, 223–27 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 and the Sinking
Fund proposal).
346 See supra notes 224–28.
347 See supra notes 259–62.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 280–81.
349 See Report on a Plan for the Further Support of Public Credit, [16 January 1795], supra note
249.
350 Barkow, supra note 20, at 29.
351 Ramirez, supra note 17, at 530–32.
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dent structure as a concoction of twentieth-century legislators who had for-
gotten or ignored the original requirements of the Constitution.  Instead, the
Open Market Committee’s multimember structure, protections from
removal, and limited appointment opportunities can be traced all the way
back to the Founding of our Republic.  This history shows that the indepen-
dent structure of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee is
consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution.
